COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON CONFESSION
IN ISLAMIC LAW AND UGANDA SECULAR LAW.
BY
ABDI FATAH FARAH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
THE CONFESSION
UNDER SECULAR LAW OF UGANDA
2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFESSIONS
2.2 RATIONAL OF THE CONFESSIONS
2.4 WHO CAN TAKE DOWN A CONFESSION
2.5 WHAT IS A VALID CONFESSION
2.5.1 WHAT THEN DOES VOLUNTARINESS MEAN?
2.5.2 CONFESSIONS OBTAINED THROUGH INDUCEMENTS AND THREATS
2.6 REPUDIATION AND RETRACTION OF CONFESSION
2.6.1 How making of a statement can be proved.
2.6.2 Corroboration of a confession.
2.7 PROCEDURE OF
RECORDING CONFESSIONS.
2.8 CONFESSIONS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED.
3.0.1 Shariah evidence for validity of confession
3.1 CONDITIONS FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFESSION
3.3 CONFESSIONS IN HUDUD CASES
3.5 THE CONFESSION OF CO-ACCUSED
3.6 RETRACTION FROM CONFESSION
COMPARISON OF
THE CONCEPT OF CONFESSION UNDER THE SECULAR LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
LIST OF CASES
R vs Warrick (1783) 1 Leach
263
Swami Vs King Emperor (1939)I
ALLER 397
Uganda Vs Yosamu
Mutalanzu (1988-92) HCB 44
Ibrahim Vs R (1914) AC
599 at 588
R Vs Baldry (1852)2 Den
430
Dpp Vs Pinglin (1976) AC
574 At 600
Meritimer Vs Meritimer (1820)
hag con 310 at 315
R Vs Thompson (1893) 2 B12
at 18
Burns Vs R (1975) 132 CLR
262
Wong Kam Ming Vs R (1980)
AC 251
Gallis V Gunn (1964) 1 QB
495
R Vs Prager (1972) 1 ALLER 1114
R Vs Priestly (1967) 51
Cr App Rep 1
R Vs Fulling (1987) 4 B
426
R Vs Davison (1988) Crim
LR 442
Dpp Vs Blake (1989) 88 Cr
App Rep 179
R Vs Goldenberg (1989)
88 Cr App Rep 285
R Vs Doolan (1988) Crim
LR 747
R vs Ronnie (1982)
ALLER 385
R vs Delaney (1989) 88 Cr
App Rep 342
Beronda vs Uganda
(1974) EA 46
Kanyike vs Uganda
(1993) 3 KLR 76
R vs Bourne (1910) Cr AP
8
Njuguni and Others Vs R
(1921) EACA 316
Commissioner of customs
and exercise Vs Harts (1967) ALLER 177
R Vs Zaveckas (1970) WLR
516
Uganda vs Ewaku s/o Edulu
(1978) HCB 9
Arikanjelo vs R (1961) EA
9
Deo Kinnan Vs Queen (1969)
1 AC 20
Tuwamoi vs Uganda (1967)
EA 84
Kasule vs Uganda
(1992-93) HCB 38
Amos vs Uganda
(1992-93) HCB 29
Uganda vs Katalema and
another (1974) HCB 29
R vs Kaggwa (1961) EA 153
Karaya and others vs
Uganda (1920) EACA 32
Gopa and others vs R (1953)
20 EACA 318
R vs Agricola Kanyeerihe
(1936) 6 ULR 10
LIST OF STATUTES
Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
Civil
Evidence Act
Evidence
Act Chapter 6 Laws of Uganda 2000
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
A
comparative analysis of the law of evidence on confession in Uganda and the
Islamic law of evidence is a challenging discussion. This study is set to
examine the law of evidence on confessions in both secular law of evidence in
Uganda and Islamic law of evidence.
The
evidence of a fact is that which tends to prove its something which may satisfy
an inquirer of the fact existence, courts of law usually have to find that
certain facts exists before pronouncing on the rights, duties and liability of
the parties and such evidence as they will receive in furtherance of this task
is described as ‘judicial evidence’
The
basic law of evidence on confession is contained in comprehensive Evidence Act
which has it is origin in nineteenth century in India. Though it has now been
replaced by Local enactment where by Uganda Evidence Act is closely modeled in
the Indian Acts.
This
research will cover background of the study, confession under the secular law
of Uganda, confession under Islamic law, comparison of the concept of
confession under the two jurisdictions.
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
There
has been comparatively little legislative amendment to the Evidence Act since
it is application to, or enactment in Uganda. This is not to say that the
legislation has not at times been the subject of strong criticism and during
the inter-war period, there was a view widely felt and strongly expressed among
the members of the administrative service, who at that still discharged the
vast bulk of the magisterial work- a view bitterly and successfully contested
by most of the professional members of the judiciaries that a statutory body of
evidence law.[1]
Incorporating
the intricate principle of the English Law on the subject regarding the
inadmissibility of certain types of
evidence, in particular that of hearsay, was inappropriate to conditions in an
African country (Uganda) and largely in comprehensible to its inhabitants to
whom many of the principles were completely foreign and that injustice as a
results, frequently resulted.
In
1928, a grave miscarriage of justice took place in Kenya and a committee set up
to investigate the circumstances found that a wrongful conviction of murder had
been the results of gross abuse authority by junior members of the police force
and cost grave doubts on the suitability of the existing methods of conducting
criminal trials in Kenya, where the accused was an unsophisticated African.
Largely as result of the Committee’s report, a commission was set up in 1933,
under the chairmanship of Sir Henry
Gratten Bush, the legal advisor to the secretary of state for the colonies,
to inquire into the administration of criminal justice in the East African
territories.[2]
Recommendation
by a majority of the commission was that the provisions in the Indian Evidence
Act no confession made to a police officer should be admissible in evidence
against an accused person should be modified so as to allow such a confession
to be admitted if it were made to a senior police officer, it was recommended
that at the same time the Uganda law should be brought into line by the
exclusion of confessions when made to junior police officers.
In
1935, the Uganda Evidence Ordinance was accordingly amended so as to conform to
the majority recommendation and confessions were made in un admissible if made
to police officers below the rank of assistant inspector.
Other
amendments have been made to Evidence Act, and the major change of recent times
in the evidence legislation has been the replacement of the Indian Evidence
Act. During the course of the present century a very considerable body of Uganda’s
case law has been built up on the subject of evidence and it’s primarily to the
decision of the Privy Council, judges of the court of appeal, high court.
Currently,
in Uganda, the Evidence Act Chapter six which commenced on 1 august 1909 is
still operational.
Since
the main topic of the research is confessions.
I find it more important to briefly discuss the origin of the evidence
Act in Uganda because it’s the main statute to be used in this research.
The
African Order in Council promulgated in 1889 under Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, Provided for the setting up of
codes of courts in Africa exercising jurisdiction “ so far as the circumstances
permitted…Upon the principles of and in conformity with the substance of the
law for the time being in force in England in 1897. The East Africa Order in
Council and the Zanzibar in Council, which replaced the 1889 order in the East
African protectorate and Zanzibar respectively, stated the jurisdiction should
be exercised by the High Courts in conformity with Indian enactments, one of
which was the Indian Evidence Act.
1.0.3 ISLAMIC LAW OF EVIDENCE
Being
the divinely revealed law, Islamic law seeks a number of temporal goals the
most important of which is the pursuit of justice. Both the holly Quran and the Hadith of the
Holly Prophet (PBUH) repeatedly emphasize justice and condemn injustices
associating the former with reward and the latter with punishment.
The
Islamic law of Evidence in this case will analyze the law of confessions.
The
Islamic law has laid great stress on the evidence to prove the facts on
confession relevant for the judgment of a court unless it’s proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the crime or the defendant has
violated the right of the plaintiff, the court cannot give judgment against the
accused or defendant.
A
confession being a statement, oral or written, made by a person accused of an
offence, stating that he has committed that offence. Confession has been
recognized as a source of conclusive proof of a right and a crime by the holly
Quran and Hadith of the Prophet (PBUH)
The Holy Quran says”O you who believe, Be you’re
staunch in justice, witness for Allah even though it be against yourselves…”[3]
The holy prophet said “if people
would be given what they claim without evidence? Some persons would claim other
people’s blood and properties, but it’s obligatory on the claim to produce
evidence”
This
means that in Islamic law of evidence, evidence is thus of supreme important in
the administration of justice.
The
object of the law of evidence on confession is to lay down principles for the
proof of the fact relevant for the decision of a court.
Therefore,
I will base mainly on a topic of confession both in Evidence Act of Uganda and
Islamic law.
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In
many cases it has been found out that people fail to understand and
differentiate confession in both secular laws of evidence in Uganda and Islamic
law of evidence and what it means, its rules, principles and the limitations in
its application.
Because
Islamic law has handled the confessions differently from the secular laws.
This
research is to compare the two jurisdictions and come up with the best
recommendations on how the law on confessions can be handled in both secular
law in Uganda and Islamic law. Hence, the research is analyzing the better
jurisdiction on confessions.
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
1.
To examine how confession is defined in both Islamic law of evidence and
Ugandan law on evidence.
2.
To examine the comparison of the two jurisdictions.
3.
To recommend what will be useful for the attainment of confession under the
Evidence Act and Islamic law.
1.3 RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
1-What
is a confession in both secular law and Islamic law
2-Compare
and contrast the confession both in common law and Islamic law
3-What
are the available challenges and their solutions
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE STUDY
This
study will lead to the transformation of the theoretical abstract of confession
to the real condition in the field. Comparing the two laws at the end of this
research shall lead to critical analysis hence coming up with recommendations
which can fit the situation under confession currently in Uganda.
Therefore,
there is a comparison between both laws in application of the principles of
confessions.
1.5 RESSEARCH METHODOLOGY
This
study is doctrinal that is to say it will involve the analysis of statutory
provisions such as Evidence Act, case law and Divine provisions which include
the Holly Quran and the sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH). During the study data
shall be collected using primary sources and secondary sources
The
primary sources include, the Evidence Act, the constitution and the case laws,
whereas for the Islamic part, the Holly Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet
(PBUH)
Secondary
sources include text books and the opinion of the jurists for the Islamic law.
Technique
to be used during the study includes discussions and comparing the two laws.
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This
research will only cover on confession in Ugandan law of Evidence Chapter 6 and
Islamic law of Evidence, the extent to which the rules on confession is applied
in both set of laws and its effectiveness in courts of law in Uganda.
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW
The
researcher has researched in many books, Articles, different academic research
but has not found similar research in Islamic law of evidence and secular law
of Uganda, however has found related materials which are very important in the
completion of this research. Hence include,
H.F Morris, Evidence in East Africa
(1968) London, Sweet and Maxwell ; African press Universities stated
that; self exculpatory matter can amount to a confession if the exculpatory
statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to
be confessed. Moreover confessions must admit in terms the offences or at any
rate substantially all the fact which constitute the offence. The admission of
a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively, incriminating facts is not
itself a confession.
Sir Rupert Cross and Colin Tapper,
Cross on Evidence, 7th edition, (1990) London, Sweet and Maxwell
stated that; a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, by the
torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered
as the evidence of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it and therefore,
it is rejected.
Since
the above authors wrote about confessions in secular law, they however, did not
compare it with Islamic law on confession. Therefore, I came up with this to
compare the two laws on confessions and come up with the better jurisdiction.
Whereas in Islamic law of evidence Prof.
Dr. Anwarullah, Principle of Evidence in Islam; A. S Noordeen stated
that; a confession is a statement, oral or written, made by a person accused of
an offence, stating that he has committed that offence, and the condition must
be that a person who confesses must be adult and sane, thus confession of a
minor, insane, sleeping person or intoxicated person is not admissible and
confession obtained through inducement, threat, or violence is inadmissible.
Mohammad Saedan A. Othman, Introduction
to Islamic Law of Evidence (1996), Harzaf Enterprises also stated that a confession of an accused
person is admissible as long as it’s not obtained by force, threat, inducement
or promise.
All
the above authors on both Islamic system and secular law wrote about
confessions. Therefore, it will greatly contribute my research since I will be
referring to their work.
All
the above authors of both secular law of evidence and Islamic law of evidence
wrote about confessions, however, they did not compare the two jurisdictions.
Therefore, I came up with this to compare the two laws and come up with the
best recommendations on how best the law of confessions can be handled in both
secular law in Uganda and Islamic law. Hence the research is analyzing the
better jurisdiction on confessions.
CHAPTERIZATION
Chapter one : Introduction
Chapter two : Confession in secular law of Uganda
Chapter three : confession in
Islamic law
Chapter four :
Comparison on confession between secular law of Uganda and Islamic law
Chapter five : Conclusions and recommendations
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONFESSION UNDER SECULAR LAW OF
UGANDA
2.0 MEANING OF CONFESSION
A
confession is a species of admission but since there are special rule governing
its admissibility, it must be treated separately. No definition of confession
is obtained in the Uganda Evidence Act[4]
but it generally refers to a statement by the accused person acknowledging
guilt for an alleged crime. This definition is derived from the case of Swami V King Emperor[5]
where Lord Atkins, stated that a
confession must admit in terms either the fact which constitute the offence. Lord Atkins further stated that “a
confession is a statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he
committed the crime”.
This
is also fortified in the Uganda v Yosamu
Mutalanzu[6] where the accused was indicted for
murder. He had been drinking local gin with the deceased and on their way home;
the deceased asked for the waragi that the accused was carrying home. He
refused to hand over and the deceased administered some beatings. The accused
then stabbed him using a pocket knife and one week later the man died of the
wound. The accused made an extra judicial confession by a magistrate. Court
held that a confession connotes an unequivocal admission of having committed an
act which in the law amounts to crime and must either admit in terms the
offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence.
Confession
is dealt with in section 24-30[7].
Of these, sections 24-26 deal with confession which are irrelevant and sections
27-30 with confessions which the court will take into account what is a
confession and in what way does it differ from admission, the answer is found
in the case of,
Pakala
Narayanaswami v King Emperor[8]
“no statement that contain self exculpatory matter can amount to
confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would
negative the offence alleged to be confessed . Moreover, a confession must
either admit in terms of the offence or at any rate substantially all the fact
which constitutes the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact,
even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not itself a confession.
A
confession however, is received in evidence for the same reason as an admission,
and like an admission it must be considered as a whole. Further, there can be
an admission either in civil or criminal proceedings, whereas there can be a
confession only in criminal proceedings. And admission need not be voluntary to
be relevant, though it may affect its weight. But a confession to be relevant
it must be voluntary. There can be relevant admissions made by an agent or even
a stranger but a confession to be relevant it must be made by the accused
himself.
2.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFESSIONS
In
the early years of the development of the law of evidence, hearsay in general
and confession in particular were admitted without serious question. Although
Lord Summer in Ibrahim v R[9] asserts that the exclusion goes back to
hale, its however, interesting to note that in the context, some early statutes
do refer to such plea being acceptable only where the party shall willingly
without violence confess. The origin of the true exclusionary rule is to be
found in the id eighteen century, and achieved its first clear and
authoritative formulation in the case of
R v Warrick shall[10]
“a
confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of
fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the
evidence of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it and therefore it is
rejected.
It
is important to note that the court went out of it way to assert that the rationale of the rule was
based entirely on considerations of credit , having first denied quite
explicitly that it depended upon any regard to public faith in origin the rule
has little or no connection with the
privilege against self incrimination
either. That doctrine had developed a century or so earlier in reaction to the
oaths required by the courts of high commission and star chambers. The line
between judicial proceedings in which that doctrine came to flourish and extra
curial investigations was however,
blurred by the investigatory functions of magistrates, which were not clearly
or finally distinguish until after the establishment of a regular police force
and the passage of the Indictable Offences Act of 1848.
The
form of caution established by that legislation had an impact upon the
attitudes of the judiciary to confessions secured by the police. This was held
in the case of R v Baldry [11]
Between
the end of eighteen century and the middle of the nineteenth century the rules
excluding confessions were elaborated in a series of judgments at first
instance. The condition of that period described by Lord Hailsham in the case of
DPP V Ping Lin[12],
a time when the savage code of the eighteenth century was in full force. At
that time almost every serious crime was punished by death or transportation.
The law enforcement officers formed no disciplined police force and were not
subjected to effective control by the central government watch committee or an
inspectorate. There was no legal aid, there was no system of appeal, to crown
it all the accused was unable to give evidence on his own behalf and was
therefore largely at the mercy of any evidence, either perjured or oppressively
obtained that might be brought against him. The judiciaries were therefore,
compelled to devise artificial rules designed to protect him against dangers
now avoided by other and more rational means.
By
the mid of eighteenth century, not without some grave judicial misgiving, it
was accepted that in the words of Baron
Parke[13] “by the law of England, in order to
render a confession admissible in evidence, it must be perfectly voluntary and
there is no doubt that any inducement in the nature of a promise or of a threat
held out by a person in authority vitiates a confession.”
Thereafter,
the formulation of the rule remained relatively constant, but became more and
more rigid as a developing case law filled out the interstices of the
definition by the determination of a particular dispute.
2.2 RATIONAL OF THE CONFESSIONS
The
House of Lords declined to speculate in
Ping Lin[14]
upon exactly what basis the exclusion of involuntary confession was to be justified.
a number have been suggested both in relation to the rules excluding
involuntary confessions and to the exercise of exclusionary discretions which
apply to confessional statement and to other evidence obtained by illegal means
itself sometimes regarded as being governed by analogous policies, the general
ground for accepting admissions that what a party says against his own
interests may be presumed to be true has not always been accepted in relation
to confessions. Thus English judge asserts first in 1798 that confession is a
species of evidence which though not admissible is regarded with great distrust[15] and in 1820 that confession generally ranks
highest in the scale of evidence[16].
This discrepancy is plausible enough explained on the basis that when satisfactorily
established to have proceeded from a genuine motive and to have been accurately
recorded. A confession may well be worthy of the highest esteem but just
because this is the case, such high regard will also be sought by the less
scrupulous for statements which merely purported to satisfy these conditions.
In contested criminal cases, given that the accused is present in court, has
not pleaded guilty and has retracted his confession, there must always be a
possibility that the statement falls in to the latter category[17].
The requirement that confession be voluntary may be regarded as demanding
satisfaction of quite different rationales. As noted above, Warickshall stressed the need for the confession to be credit
worthy and to that end distinguishes sharply between the making of an oral
statement which may or may not be false and the finding of objects which it
assumes to be automatically cogent though it must be conceded that it is rare
for evidence of the letter sort to prove very much without the assistance of
testimony or other circumstantial evidence.
In
the case of Burns v R [18]
the court was anxious to point out that involuntary confessions are not
presumed to be false but that at is nevertheless, dangerous from the point of
view of the administration of justice to admit them.
Lord Salmon
makes no reference to the basis of self incrimination, but refers only to the
preservation by the judge of a fair trial by excluding involuntary
confessions. This rationale , concerned
so closely with the rights of the accused at his trial, seems to exemplify what
has been called the “protective principle”[19] yet this principle itself has found
expression in recent decisions for example in
Wong Kam Ming v R,
Lord Hailsham said
“Any civilized system of criminal
jurisprudence must accord to the judiciary some means
of excluding confessions obtained by improper methods. This is not only because
of the potential unreliability of such statements but also and perhaps mainly
because in a civilized society it is vital that persons in custody or charged
with offences should not be subjected to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to extract confession”
The
concern here was the control of police behavior indeed the rationale is
sometimes put on a still higher plane, and quite irrespective of the deterrent
force of a decision upon police practice, related to the courts expression of
abhorrence for the methods used. This is
King V R; Lord Hadson expressed the
view of the Privy Council by saying,
“This is not, in their opinion, a case in which evidence has been obtained
by conduct of which the crown ought not to take advantage. If they had thought otherwise they would have
excluded the evidence even though tended for the suppression of crime”[20]
In
a stark contrast when in Wong Kam Ming v
R[21] counsel for the respondent began his
argument by expressing the reliability principle he was sharply upbraided by Lord Diplock with the ascertain that
such an argument was contrary to authority nor the views in R v Sang[22] support a general disciplinary policy in
this area, for as expressed by Lord
Diplock
“It is no part of a judge’s functions to exercise powers over the police
or prosecution as respect the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is
obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil
law, if it was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct of the
police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary authority to deal
with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not how the evidence
sought to be adduced by the prosecution has been obtained, but with how it is
used by the prosecution at the trial”
It
can thus be seen that the cases exhibit no unanimity of approach and it was
partly for this reason that in DPP v
Ping Lin, the House of Lords took the view that any general reform must be
left to the legislature.[23]
2.3 CONDITIONS FOR CONFESSION
Conditions
are made admissible under the condition set out section76[24]
2-
If in any proceedings where the prosecution processes to give in evidence of
confession made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the
confession was or may have been obtained,
a-By
oppression of the person who made it or,
b-In
consequence of anything said or done which was likely in the circumstances
existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made
by him in consequence thereof;
The
court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him exercises
in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that
the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as a
foresaid.
8-
...”oppression” includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the use of
threat or violence (whether or not amounting to torture)
It
is important to discuss these conditions under four headings, oppression,
unreliability, causation and burden of proof.
1.
Oppression
In
the case of Gallis v Gunn[25]
in reference to statement by accused persons to the police that it was, “a
fundamental principle of law that no answer to a question and no statement is
admissible unless it is shown by the prosecution not to have been obtained in
an oppressive manner ant to have been voluntary in the sense that it has been
obtained by threat or inducements”.
In
its substantive form as a condition negative the categorization of a confession
as voluntary. In R v Prager[26],
a case in which the confession of a sergeant in the royal air force on
charges of espionage made after a prolonged but interrupted interrogation was
held not to have resulted from oppression, and the court of appeal adopted a
statement made by Sachs J in R v Priestley[27]
Whether
or not there is oppression in an individual case depends upon many elements…they
include such things as the length of time of any individual period of
questioning, whether the accused person had been given proper refreshment or
not and the characteristics of the person who makes the statement what may be
oppressive as regards a child, an invalid or an old man or somebody
inexperienced in the ways of this world may turn out to be oppressive when one
finds that the accused person is of a tough character and an experienced man of
the world The court also relied upon the following questions given by Lord McDermott to the Bentham club in
1968.
“Questioning
which by its nature, duration of other attendants circumstances (including the
fact of custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or fears, or so
affects the mind of the suspect that his will crumbled and he speaks when
otherwise he would have remained silent.”
The
terminology of oppression nevertheless, received only an inclusive definition
repeating the substantive for of the old judge’s rules. Its construction was considered
by the court of Appeal in R v Fulling[28] in this case a woman accused of fraud at
first refused to make a statement to the police, at one point during the
interview she alleged that she was told by her interrogator that her lover had
been engaged in a sexual affairs with another woman, who was incarcerated in
the next cell.
She claimed that this upset her and that in
her anxiety to get away from the police station she then confessed. She
contended that the confession would be excluded under section 76(2) (a) as having been obtained by oppression. The
trial court rejected this view and was upheld by the court of Appeal on the
basis that the police and criminal Evidence Act 1984 was a codifying Act and to
be construed without necessary reference to the old law.
This
was explained upon the basis that the newly extended grounds of exclusion on
the basis of unreliability were sufficient to cover many of the situations
previously within the wider old ambit of “oppression”.
In
R v Davison[29] they were further aggravated by the failure to
charge for the offence with which the interrogation was principally concerned
and the ground of oppression was held not to have been disapproved.
2- Unreliability
The
danger of unreliability has always been regarded as one of the factors
underpinning the development of the exclusionary rule for confession in English
law. It had never previously played a part in the formulation of the test of
admissibility which had been traditionally cast in terms of “voluntariness’’.
The introduction of this notion into the English test for exclusion was
recommended by the criminal law committee. It was not however, endorsed as a
test for admissibility but was simply to be regarded as an important matter
going to the weight of those confessions obtained otherwise than by “oppressive
treatment” the new legislation adopts the principle proposed by the criminal
law revision committee, doing no more than broaden the nature of the conduct
affecting reliability from” threat or inducement” to anything said or done
neither version limits such conduct to that performed by person in authority.
It was stressed that the test was not to be based upon the actual but the
potential, unreliability of a confession made in the relevant circumstances,
which took into account such matters as the seriousness of the offence. It
should be noted that in Victoria and New
Zealand, the courts regard an unreliability test as in no way antithetical
to the continued existence of a wide discretion to exclude on the ground of
unfairness.
Although
in R v fulling[30],
it was stated that impropriety by the police is not a necessary condition to
the establishment of potential unreliability, the operation of this head is
conditioned upon ‘anything said or done” which is likely in the circumstances
to induce unreliability. It should be noted that the test is objective in the
sense that it’s immaterial that the police are unaware of the factors inducing
the potential unreliability or they acted in perfect good faith. This was
discussed in the case of, DPP v Blake[31],
if the mental condition of the suspect is such that any statement he makes is
likely to be unreliable; it may be thought that even the most innocuous remark
might satisfy this requirement. Such view was however, rejected by court of
appeal in
R v Goldenberg[32],
in respect of interviewing of drug addict who might have been desperate for
release in order to satisfy his addition, where it was emphasized that the
stimulus must be external to the suspect, and likely to have an effect upon
him. On the other hand it seems that in the case of such a suspect very little
pressure may take the case over the line and into the area of potential
unreliability. As noted above breaches of the codes of practice may influence a
court in deciding that oppression has not been disapproved, it will if anything
be easier to contend that unreliability under this head has been disapproved as
discussed in the case of R v Doolan [33]
3- Causation
In
Ping Lin case[34], Lord Hailsham remarked that “it’s the
chain of causation which has to be excluded by the prosecution and not the
hypostatization of any part of it”.
Given the difficulties to which the notion of causation has led in other
areas of the law , it might have been feared that such concentration might
prejudice the simplicity of the test for admissibility aimed at in ping line case , but such fears were
alleged by the decision of the court of appeal in R v Ronnie[35], in this case, the accused claimed
that he had confessed because he was under duress, had been threatened by the
police and wanted to prevent the rest of his family being charged with
complicity in the frauds of which he was suspected. His evidence to this effect
had received some support from one of the police witnesses who had testified
that he believed that the accused had confessed in order to prevent the
involvement of his family. Never the less, the court of appeal while
recognizing, that in most cases there are mixed motive for confessing and that
some of them may be inspired by
something said or done by the interrogator, felt that it would be wrong to
apply any refined analysis of the concept of causation.
The
judge should instead apply the spirit of the test in much the way as it would
be applied by a jury.
In
a mixed motive case, this would appear to require a determination of the
dominant motive. It should perhaps be noticed that there is a slight difference
in the drafting of the two conditions in that the first relating to oppression
is introduced by the word ”by”, where as the second which relates to
unreliability is introduced by the phase ” in consequence of” if anything should turn on that difference, it
would presumably be to require less in
the way of the demonstration f a causal link in the case of oppression, which
may perhaps more readily be inferred and where the law will be more anxious to
mark its disapproval.
It
is important to note that in order to qualify for exclusion, a causal link must
always be established between something said or done by the
interlocutor and the person making the confession.
4- Burden of proof.
In
the case of DPP V PING LIN[36]
at common law, it was for the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a confession was voluntary.
The matter is tested whenever ‘it’s represented to the court’ that one of the
conditions has been satisfied. It has been held that merely to cross examine so
as to suggest the satisfaction of the invalidating conditions of section 76 is
not sufficient. This might have appeared to suggest that the court could no
longer take the print of its own motion, but any such argument has been
pre-empted by explicit provision allowing such a course.
In
most cases of course, the defense will itself raise the point, usually with the
prosecution informally and before trial so that a disputed confession will not
be opened before its admissibility has been tested. Breach of the provisions of
the codes of practice requiring the documentation of action by the police may
operate to prevent the prosecution from being able to negate the exclusionary
conditions of section 76 as seen in the case of R v Delaney[37]
2.4 WHO CAN TAKE DOWN A CONFESSION
Under
the constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995[38],
states that an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty or until
he or she pleads guilty.
From
this constitutional provision, an accused person has a right either to remain
silent and not to make any statement that may incriminate him or an accused may
make statements admitting his or her guilty. However, recognizing these rights
and the importance of confessions, certain safeguards have been developed to guide
the making and taking of confessions.
Before
1971, confessions could be made before a police officer of the rank of corporal
by virtue of decree 25/71. This provision was amended such that a confession
could only be made to a police officer of/above the rank of assistant inspector
and before a magistrate.
Section 23(1) [39]
states
that no confession made by any person while he or she is in the custody of a
police officer shall be proved against any such person unless it is made in the
immediate presence of,
(a)
A police officer of or above the rank of assistant inspector, or
(b)
A magistrate, but no person shall be convicted of an offence solely on the
basis of a confession made under paragraph (b) unless the confession is
corroborated by other material evidence in support of the confession
implicating that person.
Beronda v Uganda,[40] a
confession had been made to a magistrate (by appellant) who was alone with the
accused apart from the interpreter. The trial judge stated that a police
officer should have been present. The appellant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death on the basis of voluntary confession and circumstantial
evidence. On appeal, court held that the procedure adopted by the magistrate
was wholly correct that it is undesirable that the police should be present
while confession is recorded.
2.5
WHAT IS A VALID CONFESSION?
Section 24,[41]
contains a substantive provision that makes confessions obtained through use of
force, violence, threats, inducement or promises calculated to cause an untrue
confession to be made in admissible . This section makes such confessions
irrelevant
The
law insists on voluntariness for 2 reasons,
1-confessions
are a suspect species of evidence because people don’t normally make statements
that are pre-judicial to them in their interest and so where such statements
are made there is reason to suspect that there was undue inference.
2-our
investigating machinery is bounty in the policing system that lacks resources.
This causes overzealous police officers to adopt all sorts of methods of
security conviction e.g torturing suspects, threats etc
Kanyike v Uganda, [42]
court held that the voluntariness or otherwise of a confession can only be analyzed
at a trial.
2.5.1 WHAT THEN DOES VOLUNTARINESS MEAN?
In DPP V Ping Lin[43]
the
appellant was arrested for using drugs, after some remarks by the police, he
told them about his own part in the drug dealings and even gave more
information about other deals. On the issue of whether those statements were
admissible against him. The court emphasized that a confession had to be
secured voluntary and where an objection is raised about a confession, the onus
is on the prosecution to satisfy the judge beyond reasonable doubt that the
statement was made voluntary.
A person in authority is
one engaged in the arrest, detention and the examination of the accused or prosecution
of the accused. R V Bourne[44]
,or someone acting in the presence and without a descent of such
person e.g an arresting officer or
police officer having the accused in custody etc.
In
Njuguni and others v R [45]
court that that it is a duty of a judge to examine with closest care and
attention all circumstances in which a
confession has been obtained from an accused person particularly if this
person has been at police station for a long time before making that confession
and that the onus is upon the prosecution to prove affirmatively that a
confession has been obtained voluntary and that if there were any inducements
they ceased to operate on the mind of the accused at the time of the making of
the confession.
2.5.2 CONFESSIONS OBTAINED THROUGH INDUCEMENTS AND THREATS
Generally
torture, threats, inducements etc would make a confession inadmissible but this
will only happen where these things operated on the mind of the accused that
caused the accused to say what he said. There is no stated measure of what
amounts to a threat or an inducement and each case has got to be considered for
it is own purpose. In commissioner of
customs and exercise v Harts [46]
during the course of investigating tax evasions, Harts was interrogated for
about 3 hours and he made some incriminating admissions and was convicted on
appeal against the conviction. Court held that these statements were not
admissible because they would not have been made had Harts not been told that
he must answer the questions or face prosecution and therefore, were made under
threats.
Inducements/threats
may be effected in ways other than just speech e.g threats against one’s
family, the accused may be kept in a dark room and be entertained by the sound
of beating administered /coming from other rooms, the accused may just be
starred at.
In
R V Zaveckas[47],
the accused was charged with theft from a telephone booth, prior to the
trial, he asked the police officer” if a make a statement will you give me bail
now. And the police officer said ‘yes’ and the man made a written confession
and was convicted, on appeal, court held that it made no difference that it is
the accused not the police officer who raised the question of bail. That the
statement was made as a result of an
inducement by a person in authority and therefore, the conviction was
improper.
Similarly,
in Uganda v Ewaku s/o Edulu[48],
court held that a confession extracted from an accused person by torture can
hardly be said to be voluntary.
Under Section 25[49],
states that if such confession as is referred to in section 24 is made after
the impression caused by any such violence , force, threat, inducement promise
has in the opinion of the court have been fully removed , then it is relevant.
This
provision impliedly places a duty on courts to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the making of a confession and if courts are of the opinion that
the threat or inducement had been removed at the time of the confession, and
then it will become admissible.
Arikanjelo v R[50],
a mother left a year old daughter with the appellant, the girl disappeared and
was found drowned, there was medical evidence to show that she had been
sexually assaulted prior to the death. When the appellant was arrested, he
admitted having drowned the girl a day before. A police officer told him “you
are going to say what you told me yesterday but am not going to force you to do
so”. Thereafter, he was cautioned and he made a confession.
On
appeal, court held that the words did not constitute a threat or an order in
the mind of the appellant because they were tempered by the words which
followed and any possible effects they might still have had on the appellant
would have been bated or removed by the words of caution that followed.
Under section 26[51]
a
confession cannot be merely irrelevant because it was made under a promise of
security or in consequence of deception or drunkenness or a result of trickery.
In Doe kinnan v the Queen[52],
the appellant was arrested for theft and murder while at the cell, he told a
friend that he had murdered one of the men and even described where the money
had been hidden. The money was recovered and he was convicted. On appeal, it
was held that the appellant regarded B as a trusted friend and the questions B asked
were not based on any promises neither was there compulsion in confessing the
murder because B never promised anything if he was told.
2.6 REPUDIATION AND RETRACTION OF CONFESSION
The
validity or otherwise of the confession becomes an issue when a confession is
challenged in other words, when cases of repudiation and retraction arises. Retraction means that the accused has
admitted the statement but wants to go back on it; he may claim that it was not
true; he may claim that it was a mistranslated. Whereas, repudiation means that the accused person denies that he never made
the statement alleged. Retraction and repudiation are common features of
Uganda’s criminal law and they arise because of the way confessions are
extracted. In the case of Tuwamoi v Uganda[53],
the appellant was alleged to have committed a murder with the use of a spear.
The deceased had made a dying declaration to his daughter and it admitted. The
appellant made a confession and the following day he made a different statement
completely denying the offence, only the first statement was adduced as evidence
in court.
Court
held that the basic difference between retraction and repudiation is that a
retracted statement occurs when the accused person admits that he made a
statement but now seeks to disown it generally on the grounds that he had been
forced to make the statement. While a repudiate statement is one where the accused
denies that he never made it.
Court
also held that it is a well established rule of prudence that it is dangerous
to act upon a retracted confession unless it is corroborated in a material
particulars or the court is satisfied in it is truthfulness. That trial court
should accept with caution a confession which has been retracted or repudiated.
It
has been the practice for courts to draw a clear distinction between a
retracted confession and a denied, where the accused maintains that he never
made the confession at all or that the record, probably through faulty
translation, does not represent what he actually said. In the case of a denied
confession, provided that the court was satisfied that the accused made it, it
would be reasonable to infer that it was denied because of its truth and
corroboration would not normally be necessary.
2.6.1 How making of a statement can be proved.
This
can be proved by conducting a trial within a trial. This is a ‘mini trial’ with
the main trial and the type of evidence that can be led by the prosecution can
be oral evidence and or documentary evidence.
In Kasule v Uganda[54],
the Supreme Court reiterated the law and stated that a trail within a trial
should have been held to establish the truth about the confession (in this
case, a man had retracted his confession). The Supreme Court also emphasized
that it is trite law that a retracted confession won’t normally support
conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidences but that the court
might do so if it is fully satisfied in the circumstances of the case that the
confession must be true.
Further,
in Amos v Uganda[55],
court held that it is trite law that when the admissibility of a confession
is challenged, then the objecting accused must be given a chance to state by
evidence his grounds of objection through a trial within a trial. That the
purpose of a trial within a trial is to decide upon the evidence of both sides,
whether a confession should be admitted or not
2.6.2 Corroboration of a confession.
In
matters of repudiation and retraction, corroboration is a very important aspect,
because confessions are in many cases suspects, court will insist on
corroboration before a conviction. There is always a need to look for other
independent evidence connecting the accused with the crime. This would be
evidence that supports other evidence already on record and it would be through
witnesses etc. most cases emphasizes
that the court won’t convict on an uncorroborated confession but
although courts insist on this, as a matter of practice, if there is
overwhelming evidence against the accused, the court may dispense with the
requirement for corroboration.
In the case of Kasule v Uganda[56],
the Supreme Court also emphasized that it is trite law that a retracted
confession won’t normally support conviction unless it is corroborated by other
evidence but that the court might do so if it is fully satisfied in the
circumstances of the case that the confession must be true.
However,
as a matter of practice, the trial court should direct itself that it is
dangerous to act upon a statement which has been retracted unless there are
other corroborating evidences.
2.7 PROCEDURE OF RECORDING CONFESSIONS.
Section 24[57]
and
the Evidence (statements of police
officers) Rules[58],
provides guidelines on interrogation, instruction methods and practices as well
as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons subjected to any form
of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under jurisdiction. They
are intended to guide police officers in their interrogation of persons whether
in custody or otherwise. In particular they are aimed at ensuring that
confessions recorded by police officers are obtained fairly from a suspect.
In Uganda v Katalema and another[59]
, the issue was admissibility of extra judicial statements made by both accused
before the magistrate. Both accused had a minor injuries on their bodies, they
were questioned separately .AIP took them to the local magistrate. He also took
him with a corporal to act as an interpreter. The AIP first went in to see the
magistrate and discussed with the magistrate for sometime before ushering the
accused into the magistrate chambers. He had told the magistrate that the
accused persons wanted to confess. The statements were taken and convicted,
from which they appealed.
On
appeal court held that the AIP was very disturbing and that the AIP was with
the magistrate for 15 minutes telling him about the accuser’s earlier
statements to him, that the presence of the police corporal in the chambers of
the magistrate for use as an interpreter was intentional and one with sole
purpose of extracting statements from the accused persons.
In R v Kagwa[60],
the
recording officer failed to administer caution and it was held that there was
no sufficient compliance with the rules and the statement was rendered
inadmissible.
2.8 CONFESSIONS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED.
This
arises where 2 or more people commit an offence and they are jointly charged
but one of them makes statement which amounts to a confession, sometimes even
implicating the other accused.
Under section 27[61],
where an accused person being tried jointly with other makes a confession
affecting him or her and those others , the court may take into consideration
that confession as against that person as well as against others.
The
importance of this provision is that the court can use a confession by one
person to affect other people with whom that person is jointly charged. In
practice courts will only admit that confession if it passes the test of fully
implicating the maker before it touches others. If the statement has the effect
of shifting the guilt to the a-co-accused, then it may not be taken into consideration.
The rationale for this was a real and qualified confession, a person makes it
has exposed himself to the pains and penalties prescribed for the offence and
this is the guarantee for the truthfulness of the statement”.
Further,
in Karaya s/o Njonji and others v Uganda[62],
the first and second appellants made confessions that implicated the third
appellant. Apart from those confessions there was no other evidence against the
third appellant. Court held that it is incorrect to regard a confession made by
one accused in extra judicial statement as against his co-accused to hold that
with some corroboration it is enough to convict. What is required is
independent evidence which when linked with and supported by the confession of
the co-accused removes beyond reasonable doubt about the question innocence of
the co-accused.
Also
in Gopa and others v R[63],
court held that, the weight of evidence of a confession by an accused
against his co-accused is lessened where, he obviously intends to implicate his
co-accused and not himself, although actually he does fully implicate himself.
Conclusively,
as a general rule in Uganda’s jurisdiction is that confession under the law of
evidence given by the accused person is acceptable and taken against him or his
co-accused, as long as it is not obtained through the provisions of Evidence
Act section 24[64]
CHAPTER THREE
CONFESSION UNDER ISLAMIC LAW
3.0 MEANING OF CONFESSION
A
confession was defined as a statement, oral or written made by a person accused
of an offence, stating that he has committed that offence.
However,
the various schools of law have formulated their own definitions of confession.
And are as follows,
The shaffi definition, confession is a
testimony of the existence of a proved right against the maker himself.
The Hanafis definition, admission
of a right enforceable against oneself for the benefit of another.[65]
On
the basis of the above definitions, a confession is therefore a form of
admission for the purpose of proving a fact in order to establish a right or
interest of another person against the maker.
3.0.1 Shariah evidence for validity of confession
The
basis of confession as means of proof can be found in many ayah of the Quran
and in the Sunnah,
The holly Quran says[66],
“Nay, Man will be evidence against himself even though he were to put his
excuses”
The holly Quran says[67]
O ye, who believe, stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses for ALLAH, even
as against yourselves”.
The
holly Prophet said,[68] “O Unais! Proceed with haste to
the woman and ask her whether she confesses and if she confesses then stone
her”. The woman then confessed and thereafter she was stoned”.
3.1 CONDITIONS FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFESSION
Several
general rules have to be observed with regards to confession which may be
applicable both the rights of Allah and the rights of man. The muqirrun must be
a sound person, mumayyiz; his mind must be free from any doubt as to the
subject matter of his confession. The confession made voluntary with full
awareness of its consequences, the maker is a specific person and the subject
matter of the confession is known.
According to the mejelle, the conditions for
the confession are that the person making the confession should be of sound
mind, mature, full consent[69],
and not prevented from making any disposition under the law[70]
The
above conditions apply equally to all forms of confession in all cases either
pertaining to the rights of Allah or the rights of man. matters which are
categorized as rights of Allah are zinah, theft and the drinking of intoxicants
while matters in which the rights of man are joined is for example qazaf but
therein lies more elements of the rights of man than of the rights of Allah.
Matters which are specifically within the
realm of the rights of man are three relating to property, debts, nasab or
paternity, qisas or retaliation.
We
shall now examine these conditions in detail,
1 .A person must be adult and sane.
Thus confession of a minor, insane, sleeping person or intoxicated person is
not admissible. This is based on Hadith.
Prophet (PBUH) says, “three persons
are exempted from any obligation and liability, the minor until he attains
maturity, the insane until he recovers, sleeping person until he recovers”[71]
2. Baligh and Mumayyiz. The
Hanafis do not require in all circumstances the condition of baligh. They
however, insisted on the condition of mumayyiz for children. As a general rule,
children are not qualified to make confessions[72]
but children whose guardians have permitted them to engage in trade and to
transact with the public are allowed to
be the muqirrun with the same status as a an adult . The idea is that such
children are deemed to be on par with adults as a result of their exposure to
every day transactions involving adults.
Nevertheless, the confession made by such a
child should only pertain to matters of mu’amalat e.g debts, trusts, loans etc.
In
other matters e.g dowry, crimes, the confession of a child is not accepted even
if the child had obtained prior permission of his guardian. On the other hand
the person for whose benefit the confession is intended for is not required to
be ‘Aqil or baligh’[73]
3.
Freedom
from slavery
The
condition that the muqirrun should be free from the bondage
Of
slavery is not an absolute condition that it should be complied with strictly
before the confession can be accepted. As such the confession of a slave who
had been permitted to engage in trade is admissible including confessions
regarding hudud and qisas cases.
4.
Free
consent. The holy prophet (PBUH) said, “My
ummaah has been exempted from the liability of the action done by mistake,
forgetfulness or for which they have been forced to do”[74].
Thus confession made under threat, inducement, or promise is not admissible.
The Maliki School
requires that confession be voluntary, otherwise it is invalid even if it would
have led to the recovery of the victim in a murder or of stolen goods in a
robbery. The Hanafis also argued that it is unjust a confession obtained by
torture or threat even though it might be true.
Ibn al-qayyim and ibn hamz
adopted a middle view by not permitting involuntary confession (except in hudud
cases)
Thus ibn qayyim
points out that if the accused is fortuned in order to obtain his confession of
stealing and he does confess and the stolen property is found in his
possession, his hands should be cut off.
On
the other hand, the accused has a right of redress against those who ordered
his torture, whether this is the ruler or any other person in authority since
beating is illegal and oppressive act.
Confession
obtained by deceit was however, allowed and preferred by ibn Hamz, since no coercion is involved. On this question he
criticized imam maliki by commencing
that deceit is forbidden. Ibn hamz
attributes the use of trickery to the holy
prophet (PBUH) and Harzaf Ali who used it to obtain the confession of
certain suspects. He also argues that trickery is not like force.
However,
imam malik’s view seems the more
acceptable, for it is not true that the investigators report to deception and
deceit is not prohibited. Furthermore, coercion nullifies a confession by
invalidating the element of choice and negotiating the voluntary nature of the
confession which is requirement of its validity. This effect is likewise in a
confusion obtained through trickery. Thus the later must be considered the same
in effect as involuntary confessions. Ibn Hazm reviewed harm or the threat of
harm as the defect of involuntary confessions. While a confession gained through
deceit is not without harmful consequences, it is more important to recognize
the effect of the means employed as the means of coercing the accused to submit
the will of the confessor[75].
It
has been stated that by Hazrat Umar
that, “A man would not be secure from incriminating himself if you meds him
hungry, frightened him or confined him”.
5. Confession on behalf of another
person is not valid. This means that confession binds only
the person making it, unlike the force of evidence which extends to third
person. The MEJELLE says that “evidence
is an absolute proof in that it affects third persons; confession is a relative
proof in that it affects only the person making such confession”.
3.2 EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION
The
confession should be before a court. If it took place outside the court, there
is difference of opinion about its validity.
According
to Abu haniifa, if the confession
took place outside the court it is not valid and no evidence will be accepted
on that because if the confessor before the court then the offence will be
considered proved by his confession and not by the evidence of the witnesses,
and if he refused to confess before the court, his refusal will be considered
his retraction from the confession which is the offence of Hudud which relate
to the rights of individuals like murder.
However,
Imam Maliki, Shaffi and Ahmed all
agreed that extra judicial confession is valid if it is witnessed by two
witnesses.
Furthermore,
Imam Maliki and Imam shaffi apply it
to all cases and according to Imam Ahmed
four witnesses are required in case of zinah
on the basis of the requirement of four witnesses for its proof by testimony if
the confessor retracts his extra judicial confession, Imam Maliki considers it as withdrawal of his confession that
nullifies it but Imam Shaffi does
not consider it withdrawn unless the confessor contradicts himself in his
confession.[76]
The
majority of the jurists, however, opine that an extra judicial confession, if
voluntary, can be considered sufficient proof for an offence, liable for ta’azir if it has been made before any
authorized forum or person or it is witnessed by two witnesses and with which
the court is satisfied.
3.3 CONFESSIONS IN HUDUD CASES
The
jurists of the Hanafis School are of the opinion that the confession made in
hudud cases must be repeated for a number of times before it can be accepted.
The
number of repetitions required depends however, on the hudud category.
a.Zina
According
to the Hanafis, the confession for zinah must be repeated four times on different
occasions. They base their opinion on the tradition of the holy prophet (PBUH) related to the authority of Abu Hurairah that when Maiz came to the prophet
(PBUH) and confessed his guilty four times then the prophet (PBUH) ordered to stone him to death. It is further
supported with a Hadith related on the authority of Burraidah Al- Aslami who said
that a woman from the clan of Ghamid,
came to the prophet (PBUH) and
confessed four times that she had committed zinah. The prophet (PBUH) ordered that as she was pregnant she would be
punished when she gives birth and then the child becomes old enough to carry on
without a mother.[77]
Imam Abu Hanafis also
agrees that confession must be repeated in four different appearances even
though within the same sitting.
However, according to Imam maliki and Imam Shaffi only one
time confession is sufficient in all offences including zinah because
confession is an information and it does not need repetition, they also based
their opinion on the prophetic Hadith
where the prophet ordered Unais to
go to that woman whose servant has confessed to have committed zinah with her
and stone her to death if she confesses. The prophet did not mention four times in this HADITH and this only,
one time confession was considered sufficient.[78]
a. Theft and consumption of
intoxicants
For
the offences of theft, consumption of intoxicants and inebriation, the Hanafis jurists differ as to the
required number of times the confession must be repeated. According to Imam Abu Hanafis the confession is valid
even if it is pronounced only once
According
to Imam Abu Yusuf however, the confession must be made repeatedly before
the maker can be convicted. The number of repetitions required is according to
the number of witnesses necessary to establish the offence if the method of
proof is by way of shahadah. Abu Yusuf
and Al-Laith held that for theft, drinking of intoxicants and drunkenness,
the confession should be pronounced twice.
3.5 THE CONFESSION OF CO-ACCUSED
A
confession is a proof against the confessor only and it is not a proof against
his co-accused.
This
under Islamic law, the evidence of an accomplice is not admissible against his
co-accused unless it is corroborated with independent evidence. The holy Prophet (PBUH) said; on the authority
of sa’ad al-saidi that a man came to the prophet (PBUH)[79]
and confessed that he had committed
adultery with a woman whom he named. The holy prophet sent for the woman and enquired from her about that, she
denied the allegations. The prophet
punished the man and acquitted the woman.
Also
on the authority of Abu Hurairah and
Zaid Ibn Khalid that while they were
with the prophet (PBUH), a man stood up and said to the prophet, “I beseech you
by ALLAH that you should judge as according to ALLAH’S Law”. Then his opponent,
who was wiser than him, got up saying, “judge us according to ALLAH’S law and
kindly allow me to speak. He said, “My
son was the servant of this man and he committed zinah with his wife and I gave
one hundred sheep and a slave as a ransom for my son’s offence. Then I asked a
learned man about that and he told me that my son should receive one hundred
lashes and be exiled for one year, and the man’s wife should be stoned to
death”.
The
holy prophet said, “By
him in whose hand my soul is, I shall judge you according to the law of ALLAH.
Your one hundred sheep and the slave will be returned to you and your son has
to receive one hundred lashes and be exiled for one year. Oh Unais, go to the
wife of this man and if she confesses then stone her to death”. Unais went to
the wife and she confessed thus she was stoned to death.[80]
It’s
further based on the ground that when a co-accused confesses that he has
committed the alleged offence, he becomes fasiq
(wicked person) and does not remain credible and as such his evidence is
not admissible against his co-accused.
In the opinion of imam Maliki, Shaffi and Ahmed stated that if a man accused to have
committed adultery with a woman who is absent, hadd will be implemented on him. Similarly if he who is confessed
to
Have
committed zinah with a woman whom he does not know, had will be implemented on him. In the same way if he had
confessed to have committed zinah with a woman and she denies the allegation, had will be on him and not her. But
according to some Hanafis in cases
where one party confesses and the other party denies the charge, had will not be implemented on both of
them because the denial of the other creates doubt in the confession of the first
party.[81]
It
is important to note that according to some of the jurists, if a man and a
woman who are charged for having committed zinah stated that they are wife and
husband, their statement will be considered sufficient proof of their marriage
unless as there is evidence on their zinah. But according to imam maliki, they have to prove their marriage,
failure which will be punished.[82]
The
confession of co-accused may, however be considered a presumption in offences
liable to ta’azir’
3.6 RETRACTION FROM CONFESSION
Retraction
from confession in hudud cases is admissible before or after the announcement
of the judgment or during the execution of the punishment and it nullifies they
had punishment. But in matters related to the rights of an individual such as
qisas and diyat is not admissible. Similarly offences liable for ta’azir are
also not admissible .retraction from confession is not admissible in all civil
cases and once a person confesses, he shall be liable for the right created
there in even if he retracts it.[83]
According
to some jurists like Hassan, saeed ibn
jubair and ibn Abu Laila, retraction
from confession is not admissible in any offence whether it relates to the
rights of ALLAH or rights of man and when the offence is proved by the valid
confession, the confessor must be convicted even though he retracts the
confession.[84]
According
to Imam Abu Haifa, maliki and Ahmed
only running away during the execution of punishment amounts to retraction from
confession irrespective of whether or not he expressly retracted the
confession. But imam shaffi merely
running away during the execution of the punishment is not retraction unless he
expressly retracted and the execution of punishment will be stopped by his
running away.
Prophet (PBUH) [85]
said
that in a retraction narrated by Jabir ibn abdalla when stoning Maiz, he run
away and said, “O people, return me to
the prophet, my people deceived me and killed”, but we stoned him to death.
Later on when we informed the prophet of his running, he said, “Why didn’t you
hear and bring him to me”.
While
discussing had, if a person makes confession and afterwards retracts from such,
punishment is not to be inflicted upon him, as the punishments are purely a
right of ALLAH. These hadd include wine drinking or any intoxicating liquor.
If
a person confessed the commission of theft which is related both to the rights
of ALLAH and man and then retracted , then had will not be implemented on that
person and he will held responsible for the stolen property or it is
compensation.
Imam Maliki has
conditioned the admissibility of retraction with sound grounds. As he said that
“ retraction from confession in the
rights of ALLAH such as drinking wine, theft is admissible
provided there are sound grounds for that “
if they are no such grounds, then there is a difference of opinion
in it is admissibility, if it relates to both rights of ALLAH and man like
confession of theft, in this case, the right of the person is due on him
whether he offers some confession of
being married, he will be stoned to death
and will be whipped 100 stripes.
Of
an offence is proved by evidence as well as confession and then the accused
retracts the confession before judgment,
there is consensus of opinion among the Hanafis jurists that retraction of
confession nullifies the evidence and thus retraction from confession at this
stage will remove had from the accused. But if he retracts the confession after
judgment which was based on evidence then according to Abu Yusuf, hadd not to be implemented on him because the evidence
is only effective when there is no confession at any stage. According to Muhammad, hadd will be implemented on
him In this case because the offence is proved by the evidence.[86]
Also
imam shaffi is of the same view that if a hadd
offence is proved by the evidence of witnesses and then the confessor retracts
his confession, still the punishment of hadd will take place because it is
proved with evidence of the witnesses. This is because if retraction nullifies
the evidence then it will be made a source for removing of hadd punishment in
all cases.
It
is also mentioning that according to Abu
Haniifa, Maliki and Ahmed, if a judge heard an extra judicial confession of
an accused, he is not authorized to base the judgment on that in the court. But
there are 2 views. In shaffi school of thought,
the preferred one is that judge will not base his judgment and that he has
seen, known or heard outside the court while another view is that the judge is authorized to base his judgment on what he
has seen, heard or known outside the court.[87]
In
conclusion, although the jurists have given their views about the confession in
the Islamic perspective, the primary source they have to base on is the
teaching from QURAN AND SUNNAH (tradition) of the prophet (PBUH).
Prophet said [88] “I
have left for you two things if you will adhere to it you will not go astray.
That is the book of ALLAH (QURAN) and the sunah”.
However,
they are entitled to their opinion as long as it is in conformity with the
primary sources as mentioned.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT OF
CONFESSION UNDER THE SECULAR LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW
4.0 SIMILARITIES
The
general rule in Uganda is the same as in Islamic law, that confession under law
of evidence given by the accused person is acceptable and taken against the
person who has given it.
However,
according to the provision of section 24[89] provides for an exception to the
general rule, where a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant if the
making of the confession appears to the court, having regard to the state of
mind of the accused person and to all other circumstances, to have been caused
by any violence, force, threat, inducement or promise calculated in the opinion
of the court to cause an untrue confession to be made.
This
is the same in Islamic law position that a person, who voluntary or out of his
own confess of the wrong act done by him, shall be held responsible for such
act. This is based on the Hadith of the prophet
(PBUH), who said
“My ummaah has been exempted from liability
of actions done out of mistake, forgetfulness, coercion”.
Thus
the confession given under threat, inducement or promise is not admissible in
both jurisdictions.
The
circumstances under which a person may confess voluntary or involuntary. In the
case of Callis v Gunn[90]
where Lord Parker C.J said in reference to statements by accused person to
the police that it was.
“a fundamental principle of law that no
answer to question and no statement is
admissible unless it is shown by an oppressive manner and to have been voluntary in the sense that it has not been
obtained by threat or inducement”.
It is also in line with the Islamic law, a
confession obtained voluntary is acceptable, and however, if it is obtained by
force, threat is not admissible.
It
is agreed among the jurists that the accused cannot be forced to admit
guilty. Ibn Al-Hazm suggested in Al-Muhalla, that neither the QURAN nor
ijmaa (consensus) allow examination by beating, imprisonment or threat. And the
Malik’s require that confession be voluntary,
otherwise it is invalid even if it would have led to the recovery of stolen
property in robbery. The Hanafis also reject the obtaining of confession by
force or threat.
Under
shariah law , in a case of a doubt in a confession, it is not admissible, the prophetic tradition provides that “set aside the punishment if there is at
least a doubt”[91]
this shows that a confession given by an
accused person shall not be admitted if there is a doubt hence the accused will
not be punished.
This
is in line with the provision of Evidence Act that “the accused person shall be
entitled to be acquitted…is satisfied that the evidence by either prosecution
or defense creates a reasonable doubt as the guilt of the accused person in
respect of that offence.
Both
in secular law and Islamic law , confession can be made orally, or written which suggest any inference as o any fact in
issue or relevant fact and which made by any of the persons under
section 16[92]
4.1 DIFFERENCES
At
secular law the court does not allow confession be given in evidence against
him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable
doubt that the confession (not withstanding that it may be true) was not
obtained as afraid by…oppression including torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment and the use of threat of violence (whether or not amounts to
torture).
In
the case of Callis v Gunn[93]
, it was held that the statement by the accused persons to the police that
it was a fundamental principle of law that no answer to a answer to a question
and no statement is admissible unless it is shown by the prosecution not to
have been obtained in an oppressive manner and to have voluntary…”
However,
the differences will regard to burden of proof under the shariah law is that
confession is a voluntary act done by the accused person. Therefore the accused
person has the onus to prove that really he did the act. This is based upon the
tradition of prophet (PBUH) it was
related on the authority of Abu Hurairah
that when Maiz came to the holy prophet (PBUH) and confessed his guilty
four times, prophet then rendered to stone him to death.
Therefore,
under confession is proved beyond reasonable by the prosecution under secular
law while in Islamic law it is the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise
he or she will not be punished or liable.
In
the contemporary law, there are contradictions in the issue whether an onus of
proving that a confession was voluntary lay upon the prosecution, it was or
whether an onus of providing that it was voluntary lay upon the accused. This
was discussed in Woodroffer[94] he came up to the conclusion that “the
onus is upon the accused of showing that a confession he has made is irrelevant
but not to corresponding section of Uganda Evidence Act states that the court
shall presume that any document purporting to be a statement or confession by a
prisoner or accused person taken in accordance with the law is genuine and that
any statement as be made by the person signing at are true and that such
confession was duly taken.
In
the Ugandan case of R v Agricola
Kanyerihe[95]
, here reliance was placed on the section of the Evidence Act putting the
burden of proof as to any particularly fact upon the person who wishes the
court to believe this fact for holding that the onus of proving involuntariness
lay on the accused.
This
view has since been emphatically rejected by the East African Court of Appeal
in , Njuguni s/o Kimani and others v R [96]
, it was stated that it was “incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
affirmatively that such confessions were voluntary made and were not obtained
by improper or unlawful question or
other methods” and moreover, that it was the duty of every judge and magistrate
to examine with closest care and attention all the circumstances in which
confession had been obtained by a police officer, particularly when that person
had been in police custody.
In
Islamic law of evidence such contradictions does not exist because laws that
govern cases are not manmade laws which are entitled to contradictions but it
is spiritual and cannot be changed. For instance the holy Quran[97] and the Sunnah of the prophet (PBUH). hence
the onus of prove in Islamic law belongs to the accused person as long as he or
she fulfills the conditions of attaining puberty, being sane, awake and not
having it by threat, inducement or force.
Whereas in secular law, the accused at his
trial repudiates or retracts his confession or maintains that it was not
voluntary, then before the confession may be admitted, the court must conduct “a
voire dire”. In the absence of the assessors and decide, upon the evidence on
both sides, whether the confession should be admitted. This therefore, cannot
give effective judgment; the judges may take in appropriate decision which may
affect the accused.
However,
in Islamic law, it is clearly stated that retraction from confession in hudud
cases is admissible before or after the announcement of the judgment or during
the execution of the punishment and it nullifies the hadd punishment. But
retraction from confession in matters related to the right of an individual, such
as qisas
And
diyat is not admissible. Similarly retraction from confession in an offence
liable for ta’azir is also not admissible.[98]
According
to Imam Abu Haniifa, imam Maliki and Imam
Ahmed, merely running away during execution of punishment amounts to
retraction from confession. But according to imam shaffi, merely running away during execution of punishment is
not retraction from confession unless he expressly retracted, the prophet said “why you did not leave him so that he might have retracted and got rid
of the punishment”
Uganda’s Evidence Act [99]
in
line with the confession implicating co-accused states that “when more than one
person are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by
one of the those persons affecting himself or herself and some other of those
persons is proved, the court may take into consideration such as against that
other person as well as against the person who makes the confession.”
While
under Islamic law, a confession is a proof against the confessor only and it is
not a proof against his co-accused, thus in Islam the evidence of an accomplice
is not admissible against his co-accused unless it is corroborated with
independent evidence, it is based on the holy prophet (PBUH), that a man came
to the prophet and confessed that he had committed adultery with a woman whom
he named. The holy prophet sent for the woman and enquired from her about that,
she denied the allegation. The prophet punished the man and acquitted the
woman.[100]
If
an accused confesses it is upon the accused to confess or admit, if not then
why punish someone when not confessed or agree upon the confession of the
person confessing.
In
secular law confession of co-accused may be admitted. This is not a good law
because the accused may implicate others wrongly in order to share the
punishment or to run away from the offence. Therefore Islamic law on co-accused
is the best because it does not punish someone who didn’t confess.
Primary
the source of law in both common law and Islamic law differs. In Islamic law a
confession can be traced from the Quran and the Sunnah as the primary source of
law and the opinion of the jurists as the secondary source of law.
Whereas
in common law, the primary source is the constitution of Uganda and statutes
among which the evidence Act Cap 6, Uganda official secrets Act and case laws
as the secondary source of law. Hence it shows the authenticity of the Islamic
law because it is a divine law guided by ALLAH. At the same time is not a
surprise why a secular law has been amended several times and also having a lot
of contradictions all this is because it is a manmade law which is bound to
contradictions.
In
Uganda’s law of Evidence, confession can be given by the accused person only
once as a witness to implicate him of the offence he did. This shows that a
person being a witness against himself can confess once and it will be taken
against him. And the Uganda Evidence Act is silent about as witness giving evidence
(confession) once or more than once.
But
under the Islamic law, according to imam
Abu haniifa and Imam Ahmed, it is necessary in the case of zinah to have
four separate confessions as four witnesses. This is necessary for it is proof
by testimony.
They
based their opinion on the tradition of the prophet (PBUH), related on the authority of Burraidah Al-Aslami who said that Ghamidiyyah who was a woman from
the clan Ghamid, came to the prophet
and confessed four times that she had committed zinah, the prophet ordered that
as she was pregnant she would be punished when she gives birth to the child and
then the child becomes old enough to carry on without a mother.[101]
Therefore,
it is good to give chance to the accused to have four separate confessions as
witness because it gives him time to rethink of what he is confessing about and
also a chance to retract but if chance is not given to and the confession is
given once yet the accused might confess because of the pressure, threat or any
other reason unknown to the judge.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.0 CONCLUSION
in
conclusion according all what was discussed in line with confession in both
secular law and Islamic law, it’s clear stated that Islamic law is the best law
due to the following Hadith of the prophet (PBUH),
In
Islamic law confession is a statement, oral or written made by a person accused
of an offence stating that he has committed that offence under a condition that
if “the person is minor until he attains the age of puberty or mad until he
recovers, or sleeping person until he awakes”[102]
The
punishment of confession under hudud cases varies from that of qisas, ta’azir
because hudud cases are between the accused person and Allah, but qisas and
ta’azir are between individuals. It’s also the same with retraction from confession
in hudud cases is admissible but in matters related to the rights of
individuals such as qisas, diyat and ta’azir is not admissible.
In
Islamic law, a confession is a proof against the confessor only and not his or
her co-accused as seen in the main discussion.
Also
in Islamic law, it is necessary in the case of zinah, Allah
says[103]”
to have separate confessions as four witnesses are necessary for its proof by
testimony”
In
Islamic law, being a divine law was not amended at any time, however, the
secular law being a man made law was amended several times with a lot of
contractions as seen in the main discussion. Hence giving a momentum to Islamic
law on confessions.
5.1 THE RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Evidence Act Cap 6 should include the
definition of confession because it’s silent about it.
I
recommend that the Islamic law system should be adopted in line with the burden
of proof in Uganda law of Evidence Cap 6 under confessions because it is
the accused person to proof beyond reasonable doubt that his or her confession
is true.
In
Islamic law, the onus of proving is upon the accused person, hence it is
recommended to take the Islamic law system which has no contractions to its
ways of formation being a divine law whereby primarily Quran and Sunnah are
taken as the supreme law and it has no doubt.
Quran says “this
book has no doubt and is guidance to mankind”
I
also recommend that in issue where the accused person at his or her trial repudiates, retracts his or her confession,
court should not conduct a trial within a trial because confession is a
voluntary act done by the accused person and the decision out of the trial may
not be in favour of the accused. Therefore, it is important to adopt the clear
system under the Islamic law.
I
also recommend that Uganda Evidence Act should adopt the Islamic system on
confession implicating the co-accused because, if an accused person confesses
that he is the one to be punished and its upon the other accused to confess
also if not why punish someone when he or she has not confessed or agree upon
the confession of the person confessing.
I
also recommend that the Uganda Evidence Act should adopt the Islamic system of
four separated confessions in matters of zinah as seen in the main discussion.
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[3]
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[4] Chapter 6, Laws of Uganda 2000
[5]
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[8]
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[10]
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[11]
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[12]
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[13] R
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[14]
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[23]
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[24]
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[27]
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[28]
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[30]
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[31]
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[33]
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[34]
ibid
[35]
(1982)volume 1,All England Law Reports at page 385
[36]
(1976) Appeal cases 574 at 597
[37]
(1989)88 Criminal Appeal Report 338 at 342
[38]
Article 28 (3) (a)
[39]
Uganda Evidence Act Chapter 6, Laws of
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[40]
(1974) East Africa law report page 46
[41]
Uganda Evidence Act Chapter 6, Laws of
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[42]
(1993) volume 3,Kampala Law Reports at page 76
[43]
(1973) volume 3, All England Law Reports at page 175
[44]
(1910) 6 Criminal .Appeal page 8
[45]
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[46]
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[47]
(1970) World Law Reports at page 516
[48]
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[49]
Uganda Evidence Act Chapter 6, Laws of Uganda 2000
[50]
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[51]
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[53]
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[54]
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[55]
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[56]
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[57]
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[58]
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[59]
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[60]
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[63]
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[64]
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[67]
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[68]
Sahih al Bukhari, vol 8, p 314
[69]
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[70]
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[71]
Al-san’ani, subul al-salam, volume 4, page 78
[72]Al-san’ani,
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[73]
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[74]
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[79]
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[80]
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[81]
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[82]
ibid
[83]
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[85]
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[86]
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[87]
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[88]
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[89]
Uganda Evidence Act Chapter 6, Laws of Uganda 2000
[90]
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[91]
Al-shaukani, Mohammad bin Ali, Nail Al-Autaar, Mustaffa Al-Babi
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[92]
Uganda Evidence Act Chapter 6, Laws of Uganda 2000
[93]
supra
[94]
(1936) volume 6, Uganda Law Reports at page 10
[95]
(1936)volume 6, Uganda Law Reports at
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[96]
(1954) volume 21,East Africa Court of Appeal at page 311
[97]
2:2
[98]
Audah , Abdul Qadir, al-tasharia al-jinaial-islami, vol page 435
[99]
Section 27
[100]
Sahih Al-Bukhari Vol.3, page 356
[101]
Al-Zarqani, Sharh al- Muwatta of Imam Maliki, vol.8, page 81
[102]
Al-san’ani, subul al-salam, volume 4, page 78
[103]
Quran 4:15