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Two most used ways to structure legal answer in contract


As you will remember, the previous post introduced you to some generally recognised assessment criteria which are important when faced with the task of answering questions in contract law. These criteria are:
  1.  use of relevant authority – case law and/or statute la
  2.  clarity of expression
  3.  clear structure/logical presentation
  4.  accuracy
  5.  identification of legal issues raised by the question;
  6. definition of relevant legal concepts / principles
  7.  explanation of relevant legal concepts / principles
  8. application of relevant legal concepts / principles to the facts at hand


The previous post covered the first four of these assessment criteria which are of general importance. This post covers the last four points on the list (identification, definition, explanation and application of the relevantlaw) and, in particular, addresses the question of how you can make sure that your answer ‘covers’ these criteria.
In fact, there are two approaches both of which are intended to provide a helping hand when it comes to answering questions in contract law: the ‘IDEA approach’ and the ‘IRAC approach’. This post will first outline the ‘IDEA approach’ and then also briefly consider the ‘IRAC approach’. There is no advantage of one over the other: both are equally valid and good ways to structure your answer and both cover essentially the same things; they are only different ways of helping you to remember what is important when answering a question in contract law and to achieve a relevant and focussed answer.

First, the ‘IDEA approach’ – this stands for:
  •  I – identify the relevant legal issues raised by the facts of the questions
  • D – define the legal rules which are relevant in relation to the legal issues raised by the facts at hand
  •  E – explain these relevant legal rules
  •  A – apply these legal rules to the facts of the question

In ‘contrast’, IRAC stands for
  •  Issue: identify the relevant legal issues raised by the facts of the questions
  • Rules: set out and explain the relevant legal principles and rules as contained in case law and statutes
  • Application: apply these legal rules to the facts of the question
  • Conclusion: state the outcome of the application of the relevant legal rules in relation to the point you have discussed

The following outlines in more detail what this means in relation to either approach:

IDENTIFICATION of the relevant legal ISSUES (the ‘I’ in IDEA and the ‘I’ in IRAC)

This is the first step in analysing a question is to identify the legal issues which are raised by the facts of the question. The identification of the relevant legal issues is an important part of your answer as it points you in the direction of those ‘things’ which your answer needs to address and thereby helps you to stick to the relevant points – remember that relevancy of what you are saying is an important assessment factor. For example, in a problem question, you will usually be asked to advise a named party. You should start by considering what the legal issue is upon which this party needs to be advised, i.e. what is his / her problem in terms of contract law? You should then proceed to consider what legal issues your answer (‘your advice’) depends upon, i.e. you need to ask yourself what the legal issues are which need to be addressed to resolve or, at least, address that problem.

The next step is then to

DEFINE /SET OUT the relevant legal RULES and to EXPLAIN them (the ‘D’ and ‘E’ in IDEA and the ‘R’ in IRAC)

Once you have identified what the legal issues are which are raised by the question, you need to set out the relevant legal principles that will help you resolve those issues. In other words, you need to define and explain these rules as you can only properly apply these rules AFTER you have outlined and explained what they mean and what their respective requirements are. In other words, you must explain technical terms and concepts to demonstrate your knowledge. It is very important not to assume knowledge on the part of the examiner; remember it is your understanding that is being assessed not that of the examiner.

This brings us back to the issue of relevancy: in contract law, the legal rules which will help you to resolve the issues raised by a set question might come from case law as well as from statute. This means that, for you to define and explain the rules properly, you must have a clear idea of the relevant law. This also means that, under no circumstances, you should yield to the temptation of writing all you know about that area of law: whilst you should not assume knowledge on the part of the examiner, you should not fall victim of the ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ approach and write everything you know about a particular area of contract law. To hope that something you have written in relation to e.g. the issue of ‘promissory estoppel’ will fit is a vain hope as such an approach does not show your understanding. Instead, all it does is to demonstrate that you have not understood what is relevant; it is not your examiner’s job to pick out what is relevant – it is for you to show to the examiner that you know what is relevant, only then will you be able to achieve a good mark. Relevancy in this context means relevant in relation to the issues raised by the scenario; therefore only consider those areas of law which relate to the issues you have identified as being relevant to the question at hand. So, for example, if a question raises the issue of damages, do not discuss the law relating to other remedies such as injunction or specific performance. Similarly, if the question raises a question which depends upon a provision from a statute (such as UCTA 1977), you will need to outline and explain this provision and, where necessary, you will have to interpret the relevant parts of that statutory provision by means of the process of statutory interpretation (which, in turn, will require you to identify the relevant rules for statutory interpretation and possibly also to define and to explain these rules).

This means for you that you should always clearly set out the relevant legal principle and you should also refer to the case from which it emanates or state the relevant statutory provision. Also, where this is necessary, you should explain any complications which are inherent in the legal principle you are discussing – in other words, you need to ask yourself if the principle applies in view of the facts at hand and / or if there are any exceptions to the rule which mean that it doesn’t apply because of the facts as stated in the scenario.

Furthermore, some questions might invite you to discuss problematic/uncertain areas of law as the relevant legal principle might actually fall in an area where the law is unclear or where there are conflicting authorities or where the case law is inconsistent. In such a situation you are actively EXPECTED to discuss these problems/uncertainties and to indicate these in advising a client as to the law’s application.– Remember: your client wants PROPER and COMPLETE advice, it does not help him if you only present him/her with the ‘good bits’, s/he needs to know about potential risks too! – A good answer will consider these difficulties, e.g. by saying “… if the first line of authority is followed then it would appear that there will be an enforceable contract on these facts, however, if the second line of authority is followed it appears unlikely that the court will find that an enforceable contract exists: it is therefore necessary to consider which line of authority is most likely to succeed on these facts … ”.

The next step then is to
 APPLY the law (which you have outlined and explained) to the facts of the question and draw your CONCLUSION (the ‘A in IDEA and the ‘A’ and ‘C’ in IRAC)

The success of your applying the law to the facts of the question very much depends upon the precision and clarity you have exercised in relation to the first three steps (identification, definition and explanation) as outlined before: if you have not done this, then the process of applying the law to the facts will be more difficult or even impossible. Be clear and precise when setting out the relevant law, it will make the application so much more easier!

This means that you must demonstrate how the law (as you have outlined and explained it) applies to the facts of the question, i.e. you must show what the rule you have just outlined means for the scenario at hand. In this context, it might be helpful to you to look at how courts have dealt with a similar issue. At any rate however, you will have to APPLY the law to THE FACTS of the scenario in front of you, which means that you will have to refer to the DETAILS of that scenario when applying the relevant legal principle in order to substantiate your argument.

For example, if the scenario involves the question whether a contract has been concluded between A and B, then the obvious points to consider are ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’; after having defined and explained what e.g. an offer is in the eyes of the law, you then need to apply the requirements for an offer to the case, i.e. you need to point out/explain why, in view of the facts of the scenario, something might or might not be an offer.

Scope of the power of the civil court

Answered by: Legusc team

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Qn: Explain the scope of the powers of the civil court:

a) To examine the witnesses called by the parties.

b) To summon and examine witnesses on its own accord.

 

 

  1. O INTRODUCTION.

 

In our introductory remark it is our duty to define the word examination as used under the law; this is simply because the word witness is common to the members of the class.

Examination means the questioning of a witness on oath or affirmation, and in court of law witness is subject to examination in chief cross-examination and re examination[1].

 

When the suit comes up for hearing, the party having the right to begin will state his case and produce his evidence in support of the issues, which he is bound to prove. The order in which parties will be required to produce evidence depends largely on the question as to who has the burden of proving a particular issue. In general, the plaintiff, being the person who asserts facts on which his cause or causes of action are founded, has the right to begin, under the civil law the right to begin the case is vested to the plaintiff unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the Plaintiff as per O XVIII r 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (herein after is referred to as CPC).

 

The duty of adducing evidence whether oral or documentary before the court is upon the parties and, or their witnesses. Therefore when the court set the day of hearing the parties may obtain, on application to the court or to such officer of the court appointed on this behalf, summonses to a person whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce documents, as per O XVI r 1 of CPC, also under Order XVI rule 2 (1) of CPC   provide that;

 

 

“The party applying for a summons shall, before the summons is granted and within a period to be fixed, pay into court such a sum of money as appears to the court to be sufficient to defray the traveling and other expenses of the person summoned in passing to and from the court in which he is required to attend, and for one day’s attendance.”

 

This Order shall be read together with sections 23, 24 and 26 of the CPC apply so far as the witness summonses are concerned. Section 23 gives powers to the courts to issue summonses when the suit is duly filed to the defendant.

 

This process of the summons to the witnesses is done after framing the issues, the trial begins and at the trial, the plaintiff and the defendant lead evidence in support of their claims. The rule that the evidence of witnesses should not be in is in question and answers form is not absolute. There are times when the nature and importance of a question or the importance of an answer to it is such that it is necessary to record both the question and the answer to it.

 

As a general rule, all witnesses must be examined in open court[2] and on oath or affirmation, that is, they must swear or affirm (depending on their religious faith) to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The only exceptions to this rule are children of tender years, the who, if the court is satisfied, after due inquiry, that although they do not know the nature, value and obligations of oath. Such witnesses may give evidence without being sworn or affirmed.

There are three stages in examination of witnesses: examination in chief, in this, the party calling the witness examines him, that is, he asks the witness all questions the answers to which will support his case.

The aim of examination in chief is to let the witness give all the materials facts, which the witness knows and on which the case of the party calling him wholly or partly depends. When examination in chief is complete, the opposite party is given the opportunity to examine the witness. This is called cross-examination and its purpose is to test the accuracy and truthfulness of the witness, to destroy or weaken his evidence, or to show that the witness is unreliable or to extract from the witness evidence, which is favorable to the party. When cross-examination is over, the party calling the witness will, if he so desired, examine the witness again. This is called re-examination. The purpose of it is, so to speak, to mend holes or repair the damage done by cross- examination.

 

 

Section 144 of the Evidence Act provides that order of production and examination of witnesses will be regulated and governed by the law. Criminal cases by the criminal procedure code and in civil litigation by the civil procedure code.

 

 

2.0  MAIN BODY

(a)The scope of powers of civil courts to examine the witnesses called by the parties,

 

 

As far as our question is concerned particularly in the power of civil courts to examine the witness called by the parties, it is the duty of the parties to call for witness to give evidence and not the duty of the court, this was held in the case of Generose Ndimbo V B.Y Kapesi[3] that it is the duty of each party to prove the claim in civil case and the court can only summon witnesses if the court is asked to do so.

 

Therefore from the case it remain that it is the duty of parties themselves to call for the witnesses though there are some circumstances in which the court can do so, these circumstances will be explained later.

Therefore in examination of the witness called by the parties the court has the following powers in relation to examination.

Firstly the court is responsible for the order of re examination of the facts or matter, which is new by the adverse party, provided the party has permission from the court as per s.147 (3) of the Evidence Act.

 

Also the court have power to permit a witness to be recalled either for further examination in chief or for further cross examination and if does so, the parties have right of further cross examination and re examination, as provided under sect.147 (4) of the Evidence Act, and also this has been provided under O XVIII r12 of CPC, which provides that, if sometimes occur that after a witness has given evidence, either of the parties or the court may be of the view that some material facts to which the witness could have testified has been omitted, in such event, the court at any time may re-call such witness  and subject to rules of evidence, put question to him as the court may deem fit.

 

Furthermore any person present in the court may be required by the court to give evidence or to produce any document then and there in his possession or power as per O XVI r 7 of CPC.

The court has power to declare the witness as a hostile witness, therefore, the party may not declare cross examine his own witness unless the witness has turned hostile and the court has granted permission to the party to cross examine the witness.

Therefore the civil courts has power to examine the witnesses called by the parties, but this is power is limited simply because, it is the duty of the parties themselves to examine the witnesses as they are the ones who are responsible in calling them but in doing so the court may in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form and at any time of a witness of a parties relevant fact or irrelevant and neither the parties shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order without the leave of the court to cross examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question, this is per s176 of the Evidence Act.

 

The power of the court under that provisions have the following limitations which are provided under sub sect 2,in that, the sub sect 1 shall not authorize the court

 

Firstly to compel any witness to answer any question or produce any document, which such witness would be, entitled to refuse to answer or produce under Part II of this Chapter (Evidence Act) if the question were asked or document were called for by the adverse party.

 

Also to ask any question, which it would be improper for any other person to ask under sects 158 or 159, which provides for the court to decide, when questions shall be asked and when witness compelled to answer, and also for the questions not to be asked without reasonable grounds.

 

Lastly, to dispence with primary evidence of any document, except in the case excepted by this Act, it is provided that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases mentioned under the Evidence Act, and the circumstances are provided under s.67 of the Evidence Act. 

 

 

(b) The scope of powers of civil courts to summon and examine witnesses on its own accord.

 

 

It is provided by the law that parties are responsible to call witnesses simply because they are the ones who knows their case and the persons to assist them as their witnesses, however the law provides on the other hand that where the court at any time thinks it necessary to examine any person other than a party to the suit and not called as witness by the party to the suit the court may, of its own motion, cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence or produce any document, and may examine him as a witness,this is provided under O XVI r 14 of CPC.The procedures underline the fact under the adversarial system it is the party himself who will prosecute his case, thus he is in a better position to know his witnesses and secure the attendance of his witnesses.

 

It is pointed out that the power is normally used to examine expert witnesses, it should not never be used to build up a party’s case and in the case of Joseph Marco V P.Rweyemamu[4] it was held that in the case that when a witness is summoned under the provision of r 14 he is the witness of the court and not a witness for any of the parties, the court should not use its power under this rule to help to strengthen a party’s case.

 

According to the case of Thobias Zenda V Herman Zenda[5], r 14 should be exercized very rarely the judge stated that, this rule empowers the magistrate to call at his own initiative an additional witness at any stage in the proceeding if he thinks it is necessary to do so, the broad rule being that it is for the party to present his own case to the court and not for the court to make a case for litigant. The instances in which the provisions of this rule may be invoked will depend on the facts of each case. Furher more in the case of Salum V Said[6] it is held that this being judicial discreation, it has of course, to be exercised judicially, it must only be exercised where the court is satisfied that it is for the interest of justice to do so and also it is only rarely that a court will, of its own motion, in cases such as this seek to clarify an issue by requiring an additional witness.

 

 

3.0 CONCLUSION

 

From the above question it can be noted that, it is a duty of the party to civil proceedings to present his case, which is discharged by the investigating to the case, and presenting relevant evidence, the court under no circumstances should introduce in investigating a party’s case and summon witness on behalf of a party. Court has power to summon witness other than those summoned on application by the parties, and the witnesses so summoned are the witnesses of the court and not of the parties.

 

#qn

 



[1] E.Martin, A Dictionary of Law, 5th, 188

[2] O XV111 r 4

[3] [1988] TLR 73

[4] (1977) LRT.59

[5] (1977) LRT 23

[6] (1970) HCD n 95

Labour law - Scenario Question with Answers

 

I

Narciso filed a complaint against Norte University for the payment of retirement benefits after having been a part-time professional lecturer in the same school since 1974. Narciso taught for two semesters and a summer term for the school year 1975, took a leave of absence from 1975 to 1977, and resumed teaching until 2003. Since then, his contract has been renewed at the start of every semester and summer, until November 2005 when he was told that he could no longer teach because he was already 75 years old. Norte University also denied Narciso’s claim for retirement benefits stating that only full-time permanent faculty, who have served for at least five years immediately preceding the termination of their employment, can avail themselves of post-employment benefits. As part-time faculty member, Narciso did not acquire permanent employment status under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, in relation to the Labor Code, regardless of his length service.

(a) Is Narciso entitled to retirement benefits? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Narciso is entitled to retirement benefits. A part-time lecturer, with a fixed-term employment, who did not attain permanent status, is entitled to retirement pay. This was ruled by the Supreme Court in De La Salle Araneta University v. Bernardo, G. R. No. 190809, February 13, 2017 as follows: Republic Act No. 7641 states that "any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age x x x;" and "[i]n case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements." The Implementing Rules provide that Republic Act No. 7641 applies to "all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, except to those specifically exempted x x x." And Secretary Quisumbing' s Labor Advisory further clarifies that the employees covered by Republic Act No. 7641 shall "include part-time employees, employees of service and other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of another."

(b) If he is entitled to retirement benefits, how should retirement pay be computed in the absence of any contract between him and Norte University providing for such benefits? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The retirement will be 22.5 days salary, exclusive of leave conversion benefits.  According to Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Honorable Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, G.R. No. 117174, November 13,1996:

For purposes of computing compulsory sand optional retirement benefits and to align the current retirement plan with the minimum standards of Art. 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 7641, and Sec. 5 (5.2) of its implementing rules, “1/2 month salary” means 22.5 days salary, exclusive of leave conversion benefits.

xxx                                 xxx                                 xxx

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves x x x x (italics supplied).

II

Nayon Federation issued a charter certificate creating a rank-and-file Neuman Employees Union. On the same day, New Neuman Employees filed a petition for certification election with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office, attaching the appropriate charter certificate.

a) The employer, Neuman Corporation, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of legal personality on the part of the petitioner union. Should the motion be granted? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion should be denied. For purposes of filing a petition for certification election, New Neuman Employees  has legal personality from the time it was issued with a charter certificate. This clear under the Labor Code,  which provides, The chapter shall acquire legal personality only for purposes of filing a petition for certification election from the date it was issued a charter certificate. (Article 241 [234-A], As inserted by Section 2, Republic Act No. 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007) b) The employer likewise filed a petition for cancellation of union registration against New Neuman Employees Union, alleging that Nayon Federation already had a chartered local rank-and-file union, Neuman Employees Union, pertaining to the same bargaining unit within the establishment. Should the petition for cancellation prosper? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Article 247 of the Labor Code, the following are the relevant grounds for cancellation of union registration:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;

(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters;

(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

Unless the employer can prove that any of the foregoing grounds are present the petition for cancellation will not prosper.

III

Due to his employer’s dire financial situation, Nicanor was prevailed upon by his employer to voluntarily resign. In exchange, he demanded payment of salary differentials, 13th month pay, and financial assistance, as promised by his employer. Management promised to pay him as soon as it is able to pay off all retrenched rank-and-file employees. Five years later, and before management was able to pay Nicanor the amount promised to him, Nicanor died of a heart attack. His widow, Norie, filed a money claim against the company before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), including interest on the amount of the unpaid claim. She also claimed additional damages arguing that the supposed resignation letter was obtained from her spouse through undue pressure and influence. The employer filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that (A) the NLRC did not have jurisdiction over money claims, and (B) the action has prescribed.

(a) Does the NLRC have jurisdiction to award money claims including interest on the amount unpaid? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Jurisdiction will depend on the amount being claimed by Nicanor’s surviving spouse. If the amount exceeds Five Thousand Pesos (PhP5,000.00) as provided in Article 224 (a [6]) of the Labor Code then jurisdiction belongs to the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.  However, if the amount did not exceed Five Thousand Pesos (PhP5,000.00) and then jurisdiction belongs to the Regional Director under Article 129 of the Labor Code involving recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits.  Either of the said quasi-judicial body can award  interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages in accordance. The award of interest in money claim was explained in Limlingan v. Asian Institute Management, Inc., G.R. No. 220481, February 17, 2016, that the rate of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages as well as its accrual are as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.(b) Assuming that the NLRC has jurisdiction, has the action prescribed? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The action has not prescribed. This is because Nicanor’s surviving spouse’s cause of action will accrue upon the categorical denial of the claim. In this case, there was demand for its payment, however, the management had promsied to pay as soon as it is able to pay off all retrenched rank-and-file employees. However, it is was only after five (5) years that the management was able to pay. Moreover, there was no denial of the claim. Therefore, prescription did not set in. In the Degamo v. Avantgarde Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 154460, November 22, 2005 and Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, August 15, 2001, following cases, the Supreme Court explained the accrual of a cause of action under Article 306 [291].(c)

May Nicanor’s spouse successfully claim additional damages as a result of the alleged undue pressure and influence? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Nicanor’s spouse can successfully claim additional damages as a result of the alleged undue pressure and influence. This is provided under Article 224 (a [4] of the Labor Code which provides for claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relationship within the jurisdictional authority of the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

In the alternative, it can be argued that Nicanor’s spouse cannot successfully claim additional damages because it is the jurisdictional authority of the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The employer-employee relationship is only incidental and the cause of action arises from other sources like torts and damages. Therefore, jurisdiction belongs to the regular courts.

IV

Natasha Shoe Company adopted an organizational streamlining program that resulted in the retrenchment of 550 employees in its main plant. After having been paid their separation benefits, the retrenched workers demanded payment of retirement benefits under a CBA between their union and management Natasha Shoe Company denied the workers’ demand.

(a) What is the most procedurally peaceful means to resolve this dispute? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Since this is a money claim involving the interpretation and implementation of the CBA, the  retrenched workers can refer the matter to the grievance machinery and if it remained unresolved within seven (7) days from the date of its submission the same shall be automatically referred to the voluntary arbitration prescribed in the CBA.

In the alternative it can be argued, that since this is a dispute between the retrenched workers and the employer the same cannot be a subject matter of grievance and voluntary arbitration. This is because only disputes between the union and the company as ruled in Tabique v. International Copra Export Corporation, G. R.  No. 183335, December 23, 2009, shall be referred to grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. Thus, the dispute should be resolved by way of mandatory conciliation-mediation in accordance with Article 234 of the Labor Code. 

(b) Can the workers claim both separation pay and retirement benefits. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the workers can claim both separation pay and retirement benefits. This was  settled rule in the case of Goodyear v. Marina Angus, G.R. No. 185499, 14 November 2014 where it was ruled that in the absence of an express or implied prohibition against it, collection of both retirement benefits and separation pay upon severance from employment is allowed. This is grounded on the social justice policy that doubts should always be resolved in favor of labor rights. (Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87653, February 11, 1992)

V

Nelda worked as a chambermaid in Hotel Neverland with a basic wage of PhP560.00 for an eight-hour workday. On Good Friday, she worked for one (1) hour from 10:00 PM to 11:00 PM. Her employer paid her only PhP480 for each 8-hour workday, and PhP70.00 for work done on Good Friday. She sued for underpayment of wages and non-payment of holiday pay and night shit differential for working on a Good Friday. Hotel Neverland denied the alleged underpayment, arguing that based on long-standing unwritten tradition, food and lodging costs were partially shouldered by the employer and partially paid for by the employee through salary deduction. According to the employer, such valid deduction caused the payment of Nelda’s wage to be below the prescribed minim m. The hotel also claimed that she was not entitled to holiday pay and night shift differential pay hotel workers have to work on holidays and may be be assigned to work at night.

(a) Does the hotel have valid legal grounds to deduct food and lodging costs from Nelda's basis salary? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As held in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118506, April 18, 1997: Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee’s wages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. (Labor Code, Art. 97 [f])

Applying the above, unless the hotel can comply with the legal requirements   it has no valid legal grounds to deduct food and lodging costs from Nelda's basis salary.

(b) Applying labor standards law, how much should Nelda be paid for work done Good Friday? Show the computation in your test booklet and encircle your final answer. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It can be argued:

The rule in order to be paid regular holiday like two successive holidays provides as follows,   Where there are two (2) successive regular holidays, like Holy Thursday and Good Friday, an employee may not be paid for both holidays if he absents himself from work on the day immediately preceding the first holiday, unless he works on the first holiday, in which case he is entitled to his holiday pay on the second holiday.(Section 10, Rule IV, Book III, Rules to Implement the Labor Code)

Applying the above rule, unless Nelda had complied with the rules on absences she is not entitled for her holiday pay for work done on Good Friday.

However, on the assumption that she complied with the rules Nelda should be paid as follows:  P560 x 200%=P1,120.00 or since he only worked for one hour the pay should be as follows: 70 x 200% = P140.00

VI

A certification election was conducted in Nation Manufacturing Corporation, whereby 55% of eligible voters in the bargaining unit cast their votes. The results were as follows:

Union Nana : 45 votes

Union Nada  : 40 votes

Union Nara : 30 votes

No Union : 80 votes

Union Nana moved to be declared as the winner of the certification election.

a) Can Union Nana be declared as the winner? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Union Nana cannot be declared as the winner. This is because the said union did not obtain the majority of the valid votes casts as provided under Article 268 of the Labor Code.

b) Assume that the eligibility of 30 voters was challenged during pre-election conference. The ballots of the 30 challenged voters were placed inside an envelope sealed by the DOLE Election Office. Considering the said envelope remains sealed, what should be the next course of action with respect to the said challenged votes? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The procedure in the Challenge of Votes provides as follows:

The ballot of the voter who has been property challenged during the Pre-Election conferences, shall be placed in an envelope which shall be sealed by the Election Officer in the presence of the voter and the representatives of the contending unions. The election Officer shall indicate on the envelope the   voter’s name, the union challenging the voter, and the ground for the challenged. The sealed envelope shall then be signed  by the Election Officer and the representatives  of the contending unions. The Election  Officer shall note all challenges in the minutes of the election proceedings and shall have custody of all envelops containing the challenged votes. The envelopes shall be opened and the question of eligibility shall be passed upon by the Mediator-Arbiter only if the number of segregated votes will materially alter the results of the election. (Section 11, Rule IX, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-F-03, Series of 2008 and renumbered by Department Order No. 40-I-15, Series of 2015)

Applying the said procedure, if the number of segregated votes will materially alter the results of the election the next course of action with respect to the said challenged votes is to open the said envelopes and the question of eligibility shall be passed upon by the Mediator-Arbiter.  VII

Nico is a medical representative engaged in the promotion of Pharmaceutical products and medical devices for North Pharmaceuticals, Inc. He regularly visits. physicians' clinics to inform them of the chemical composition and benefits of his employer's products. A the end of everyday, he receives a basis wage of PhP700.00 plus a PhP150.00 "productivity allowance." For purposes of computing Nico's 13th month pay, should the daily "productivity allowance" be included? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

For purposes of computing Nico's 13th month pay his daily "productivity allowance" cannot be included.

 In Philippine Spring Water Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 205278, June 11, 2014, clarified as to when a commission forms part of basic salary to be considered in the computation of 13th month pay. The High Court said: It is well-established in jurisprudence that the determination of whether or not a commission forms part of the basic salary depends upon the circumstances or conditions for its payment. In Phil Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110068, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 747, the Court held that commissions earned by salesmen form part of their basic salary. The salesmen’s commissions, comprising a pre-determined percentage of the selling price of the goods sold by each salesman, were properly included in the term basic salary for purposes of computing the 13th month pay. The salesmen’s commissions are not overtime payments, nor profit-sharing payments nor any other fringe benefit, but a portion of the salary structure which represents an automatic increment to the monetary value initially assigned to each unit of work rendered by a salesman. On the other hand, in Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De la Serna, G.R. Nos. 92174 and 102552, December 10, 1993, 228 SCRA 329, the so-called commissions paid to or received by medical representatives were excluded from the term basic salary because these were paid to the medical representatives and rank-and-file employees as productivity bonuses, which were generally tied to the productivity, or capacity for revenue production, of a corporation and such bonuses closely resemble profit-sharing payments and had no clear direct or necessary relation to the amount of work actually done by each individual employee.

Applying the above rule, the productivity allowance cannot be included.

NOTE: The foregoing answer can be found in page 492 of the book entitled Principles and Cases Labor Standards and Social Legislation, Second Edition 2018. Question involving the same  subject matter was given during the 2011 Bar Examination. An alternative answer can be given by stating that it will depend as to whether the productivity bonus form part of the salary. In fine, whether or not the productivity bonus forms part of the basic salary depends upon the circumstances or conditions for its payment, which indubitably are factual in nature. If the productivity bonuses were because they were generally tied to the productivity, or capacity for revenue production it will not form part of the salary. However, if has a clear direct or necessary relation to the amount of work actually done by each individual employee then it form part of the salary. This was the distinction given by the case of Reyes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007 citing the cases of   Phil Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110068, November 11, 1993 and monetary value initially assigned to each unit of work rendered by a salesman. On the other hand, in Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De la Serna, G.R. Nos. 92174 and 102552, December 10, 1993.

VIII

Nathaniel has been a salesman assigned by Newmark Enterprises (Newmark) for nearly two years at the Manila office of Nutrition City, Inc. (Nutrition City). He was deployed pursuant to a service agreement between Newmark and Nutrition City, the salient provisions of which were as follows:

a) the Contractor (Newmark) agrees to perform and provide the Client (Nutrition City), on a non-exclusive basis, such tasks or activities that are considered contractible under existing laws, as may be needed by the Client from time to time;

b) the Contractor shall employ the necessary personnel like helpers, salesmen, and drivers who are determined by the Contractor to be efficiently trained;

c) the Client may request replacement of the Contractor’s personnel if quality of the desired result is not achieved;

d) the Contractors personnel will comply with the Client's policies, rules, and regulations; and

e) the Contractor’s two service vehicles and necessary equipment will be utilized in carrying out the provisions of this Agreement.

When Newmark fired Nathaniel, he filed an illegal dismissal case against the wealthier company, Nutrition City, Inc., alleging that he was a regular employee of the same. Is Nathaniel correct? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nathaniel is correct in so far as the existence of employer-employee relationship between him and the principal.

The rules requires that the Service Agreement between the principal and the contractor shall include the following:

i. The specific description of the job or work being subcontracted, including its term or duration.

ii. The place of work and terms and conditions governing the contracting arrangement, to include the agreed amount of the contracted job or work as well as the standard administrative fee of not less than ten percent (10%) of the total contract cost; and

iii. A provision on the issuance of the bond/s defined under Section 3(a) renewable every year. (Section 11, D.O. No. 174, Series of 2017)

On the other hand, a finding of violation of 11 shall render the principal the direct employer of the employees of the contractor or subcontractor, pursuant to Article 109 of the Labor Code, as amended. (Section 12, D.O. No. 174, Series of 2017)

Applying the above rules, since Newmark and Nutrition City violated the required terms to be stated in the Service Agreement then Nutrition City is the direct employer of Nathaniel.

As to whether Nathaniel is a regular employee of Nutrition City, the rules are as follows:

Regular employees are further classified into: (1) regular employees by nature of work; and (2) regular employees by years of service. (E. Ganzon, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123769, 22 December 1999, 321 SCRA 434, 440) The former refers to those employees who perform a particular activity which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, regardless of their length of service; while the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job, regardless of the nature thereof, for at least a year. (Pangilinan vs. General Milling Corporation, G.R. No. 149329, 12 July 2004)

Tested from the nature of his work and the activity of the principal Nathaniel could be a regular employee while if it is tested on the length of service then Nathaniel is a regular employee as he has been employed with the principal for a least a year. In fact he was employed for nearly two years.  

NOTE: The foregoing answer can be found in page 561 of the book entitled Principles and Cases Labor Standards and Social Legislation, Second Edition 2018, and page 676 of the book entitled Principles and Cases Labor Relations, Second Edition 2018, by Atty. Voltaire T. Duano. Questions involving the same  subject matter were given during the 2009 (on terms of Service Agreement) and 22013 and 2008 (on regular employees) Bar Examinations. An alternative answer can be given by characterizing the relationship of the principal with the contractor as to whether it is a job contracting or LOC.  Then as to who would be the direct employer and extent of liability can be determined or concluded. 

IX

Sgt. Nemesis was a detachment non-commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nueva Ecija. He and some other members of his detachment sought permission from their Company Commander for an overnight pass to Nueva Vizcaya to settle some important matters. The Company Commander orally approved their request and allowed them to carry their firearms as the place they were going to was classified as a “critical place.” They arrived at the place past midnight; and as they were alighting from a tricycle, one of his companions accidentally dropped his rifle, which fired a single shot, and in the process hit Sgt. Nemesis fatally. The shooting was purely accidental. At the time of his death, he was still legally married_to Nelda but had been separated de facto from her for 17 years. For the last 15 years of his life, he was living in with Narda, with whom he has two minor children. Since Narda works as a kasambahay, the two children lived with their grandparents, who provided their daily- support. Sgt. Nemesis and Narda only sent money to them every year to them for their school tuition.

Nelda and Narda, both for themselves and the latter, also on behalf of her minor children, separately filed claims for compensation as a result of the death of Sgt. Nemesis. The Line of Duty Board of the AFP declared Sgt. Nemesis’ death to have been “in line of duty’, and recommended that all benefits due to Sgt. Nemesis be given to his dependents. However, the claims were denied by GSIS because Sgt. Nemesis was not in his workplace nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army when he died.

(a) Are the dependents of Sgt. Nemesis entitled to compensation as a result of his death? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The death of Sgt. Nemesis is compensable because it is work-connected. However, in so far as entitlement of the dependents of Sgt. Nemesis for compensation as a result of his death the  dependent spouse cannot claim compensation. The law requires that the  dependent spouse  should be a legitimate spouse living with the employee. (Article 173 [i], Labor Code).

In this case, the legitimate spouse Nelda is not entitled because she is not living with Sgt. Nemesis while Narda will not qualify as dependent spouses as she is not a legitimate spouse of Sgt. Nemesis although she is living with the latter. On the other hand, in so far as the dependent child the law requires that the dependent child be legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or xxx, who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age provided he is incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.  The two minor children are therefore qualified as dependent children. Hence, entitled to compensation.

(b) As between Nelda and Narda, who should be entitled to the benefits? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nelda and Narda  are not entitled to the benefits because they failed to qualify within the definition (Article 173 [i], Labor Code) of dependent spouse.

X

Nonato had been continuously employed and deployed as a seaman who performed services that were necessary and desirable to the business of N-Train hipping, through its local agent, Narita Maritime Services (Agency), in accordance with the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (2010 POEA-SEC). Nonato's last contract (for ye months) expired on November 15, 2016. Nonato was then repatriated due to "finished contract." He immediately reported to the Agency and complained that e had been experiencing dizziness, weakness, and difficulty in breathing. The agency referred him to Dr. Neri, who examined, treated, and prescribed him with medications. After a few months of treatment and consultations, Nonato was declared fit to resume work as a seaman. Nonato went back to the Agency to ask for re-deployment but the Agency rejected his application. Nonato filed an illegal dismissal case against the Agency and its principal, with a claim for total disability benefits based on the ailments that he developed on board N-Train hipping-vessels. The claim was based on the certification of his own physician, Dr. Nunez, that he was unfit for sea duties because of his hypertension and diabetes.

a) Was Nonato a regular employee of N-Train Shipping? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nonato is not a regular employee of N-Train Shipping. The fact that seafarers are not regular employees is already a settled rule.

In Petroleum Shipping Limited  (formerly Esso International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd.) v. NLRC, G.R. No. 148130, June 16,2006, the Supreme Court said that the issue on whether seafarers are regular employees is already a settled matter. Thus, the High Court said:

It was in Ravago v. Esso Eastern Marine, Ltd., G.R. No. 158324, 14 March 2005, 453 SCRA 381 where the Honorable Supreme Court traced its ruling in a number of cases that seafarers are contractual, not regular, employees.  Thus, in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 48494, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 702 the Supreme Court cited overseas employment contract as an example of contracts where the concept of regular employment does not apply, whatever the nature of the engagement and despite the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code.  In Coyoca v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113658 March 31, 1995, the Supreme Court held that the agency is liable for payment of a seaman’s medical and disability benefits in the event that the principal fails or refuses to pay the benefits or wages due the seaman although the seaman may not be a regular employee of the agency.

The Supreme Court squarely passed upon the issue in Millares v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110524,  July 29, 2002, where one of the issues raised was whether seafarers are regular or contractual employees whose employment are terminated every time their contracts of employment expire.  The Supreme Court explained:

[I]t is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees.  They can not be considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.  Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires.  Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time.  They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.  We need not depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis  with respect to the employment status of seafarers.

b) Can Nonato successfully claim disability benefits against N-Train Shipping and its agent Narita Maritime Services? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The claim for disability benefits of Nonato against N-Train Shipping and its agent Narita Maritime Services will not prosper for prematurity.

The Supreme Court laid down the procedures for filing disability benefits and its effect in case of failure to comply with the procedures in Daraug v. KGJS Fleet Management Manila, G.R. No. 211211, January 14, 2015. Thus, in denying the claim for disability benefits due to prematurity the Supreme Court ruled:

Petitioner Did Not Comply With The Procedures

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.31 (Vergara), it was stated that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through the POEA, has simplified the determination of liability for work-related death, illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working on foreign oceangoing vessels. Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment of the seaman for overseas work. The POEA-SEC is supplemented by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the owner of the vessel and the covered seaman. In this case, the parties entered in to a contract of employment in accordance with the POEA-SEC and they agreed to be bound by the CBA.

Thus, in resolving petitioner’s claim for disability compensation, the Court will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and in the CBA. On this point, Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed a compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Xl

Your favorite relative, Tita Nilda, approaches you and seeks your advice n her treatment of her kasambahay, Noray. Tita Nilda shows you a document called a “Contract of Engagement” for your review. Under the Contract of Engagement, Noray shall be entitled to a rest day every week, provided that she may be requested to work on a rest day if Tita Nilda should need her services that day. Tita Nilda also claims that this Contract of Engagement should embody the  terms and conditions of Noray’s work as the engagement of a kasambahay is a private matter and should not be regulated by the State.

a) Is Tita Nilda correct in saying that this is a private matter and should not be regulated by the State? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Tita Nilda is not correct in saying that engagement of a kasambahay is a private matter and should not be regulated by the State. This is a valid subject matter of the exercise of police power to give effect to the declared policy of the law such as the need to protect the rights of domestic workers against abuse, harassment, violence, economic exploitation and performance of work that is hazardous to their physical and mental health; and in protecting domestic workers and recognizing their special needs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions, promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs affecting the local domestic work. (Section 2, Article I, Republic Act No. 10361)b) is the stipulation that she may be requested to work on a rest day legal? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The stipulation that Noray may be requested to work on a rest day is legal. The law provides that, “ Nothing in this provision shall deprive the domestic worker and the employer from agreeing to the following:

(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;

(b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;

(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or

(d) Other similar arrangements. (Section 21, Article IV, Republic Act No. 10361)c) Are stay-in family drivers included under the Kasambahay Law?(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Stay-in family drivers are not included under the Kasambahay Law. This was very clear in the Rules Implementing the Kasambahay Law providing as follows:

The following are not covered:

(a) Service providers;

(b) Family drivers;

(c) Children under foster family arrangement; and

(d) Any other person who performs work occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis. (Section 2, Rule I, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 10361)

XII

Nena worked as an Executive Assistant for Nesting, CEO of  Now Corporation. One day, Nesting called Nena into his office and showed her lewd pictures of women in seductive poses which Nena found offensive. Nena complained before the General Manager who, in turn, investigated the matter and recommended the dismissal of Nesting to the Board of Directors. Before the Board of Directors, Nesting argued, that-since the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law requires the existence of “sexual favors,” he should not be dismissed from the service since he did not ask for any-sexual favor from Nena. Is Nesting correct? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nesting is not correct.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.—Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: xxx (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

Contrary to Nesting’s claim, it is enough that his  acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.

XIII

Nicodemus was employed as a computer programmer by Network Corporation, a telecommunications firm. He has been coming to work in shorts and sneakers, in violation of the “prescribed uniform policy” based on company rules and regulations. The company human resources manager wrote him a letter, giving him 10 days to comply with the company uniform policy. Nicodemus asserted that wearing shorts and sneakers made him more productive, and cited his above-average output. When he came to work still in violation of the uniform policy, the company sent him a letter of termination of employment. Nicodemus filed an illegal dismissal case. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Nicodemus and ordered his reinstatement with backwages. Network Corporation, however, refused to reinstate him. The NLRC 1st  Division sustained the Labor Arbiter’s judgment. Network Corporation still refused to reinstate Nicodemus. Eventually, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC and ruled that the dismissal was valid. Despite the reversal, Nicodemus still filed a motion for execution with respect to his accrued backwages.

(a) Were there valid legal grounds to dismiss Nicodemus from his employment? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Nicodemus can be dismissed on based on willful disobedience to the lawful order under Article 297 (a) of the Labor Code and the “prescribed uniform policy” of the company.

The basis is the case of St. Luke’s v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015 were it was ruled: At the same time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the dismissal of the employee. (Malabago v. NLRC, 533 Phil. 292, 300 [2006]) x x x x. Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.”

(b) Should Nicodemus’ motion for execution be granted? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Nicodemus’ motion for execution should be granted. He is entitled to his accrued salary.

The accrued wages/salaries (reinstatement wages/salaries) is the consequence of the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the Labor Arbiter referred in paragraph 3, Article 229 [223] of the Labor Code. This means that a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. In other words, it refers to the wages or salaries which automatically accrued to a dismissed employee from the notice of the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement until its ultimate reversal by the higher court, which could be the NLRC, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The entitlement to accrued wages/salaries (reinstatement wages/salaries ) of a dismissed employee was discussed in the cases of Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 152329, 449 Phil. 437 (2003), Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 479, Islriz Trading v. Capada, G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011, Pfizer Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011 and Wenphil Corporation v. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, April 7, 2014.

In resolving the rule on entitlement to accrued wages between the period where the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement is pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, the case of Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 479, is in point. The Supreme Court examined its conflicting rulings with respect to the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code, viz:

The core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads:

‘In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.’

The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

‘x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.

XIV

Nelson complained before the DOLE Regional Office about Needy Corporation's failure to pay his wage increase amounting to PhP5,000.00 as mandated in a Wage Order issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board. Consequently, Nelson-asked the DOLE to immediately issue an Order sustaining his money claim. To his surprise, he received a notice from the DOLE to appear before the Regional Director for purposes of conciliating the dispute between him and Needy Corporation. When conciliation before the Regional Director the latter proceeded to direct both parties to submit their respective position papers in relation to the dispute. Needy Corporation argued, that since Nelson was willing to settle for 75% of his money claim during conciliation proceedings, only a maximum of 75% of the said money claim may be awarded to him.

(a) Was DOLE’s action to conduct mandatory conciliation in light of Nelson’s complaint valid? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the DOLE’s action to conduct mandatory conciliation is valid. This is mandated by Article 234 of the Labor Code, except as provided in Title VII-A, Book V of this Code, as amended, or as may be excepted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, all issues arising from labor and employment shall be subject to mandatory conciliation-mediation.

(b) Should the Regional Director sustain Needy Corporation’s argument? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Regional Director should not sustain Needy Corporation’s argument. This is because under Article 239 of the Labor Cod, information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them. Thus, Needy Corporation cannot raise the argument that Nelson was willing to settle for 75% of his money claim during conciliation proceedings.

XV

Nexturn Corporation employed Nini and Nono, whose tasks involved directing and supervising rank-and-file employees engaged in company operations. Nini and Nono are required to ensure that such employees obey company rules and regulations, and recommend to the company's Human Resources Department any required disciplinary action against erring employees. In Nexturn Corporation, there are independent unions, representing rank- and-file and supervisory employees, respectively.

a) May Nini and Nono join a union? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Nini and Nono can join a union. This is clearly allowed under Article 255 of the Labor Code which provides in substance that supervisory employees may join, assist or form separate collective bargaining units and/or legitimate labor organizations of their own. b) May the two unions be affiliated with the same Union Federation? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the two unions can be affiliated with the same Union Federation. This is clearly allowed under Article 255 of the Labor Code which provides in substance that the rank-and-file union and the supervisors’ union operating within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union.

XVI

Nagrab Union and Nagrab Corporation have an existing CBA which contains the following provision: “New_employees within the coverage of the bargaining unit who may be regularly employed shall become members of Nagrab Union. Membership in good standing with the Nagrab Union is a requirement for continued employment with Nagrab Corporation.” Nagrab Corporation subsequently acquired all the assets and rights of Nuber Corporation and absorbed all of the latter’s employees. Nagrab Union immediately demanded enforcement of the above-stated CBA provision with respect to the absorbed employees. Nagrab Corporation refused on the ground that this should not apply fo the absorbed employees who were former employees of another corporation whose assets and rights it had acquired.

(a) Was Nagrab Corporation correct in refusing to enforce the CBA 4 provision with respect to the absorbed employees? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nagrab Corporation was not correct in refusing to enforce the CBA provision with respect to the absorbed employees. This is because it cannot invoke its merger with another corporation as a valid ground to exempt its absorbed employees from the coverage of a union shop clause contained in its existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with its own certified labor union. In BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010, the High Court resolved the question in this manner: At the outset, we should call to mind the spirit and the letter of the Labor Code provisions on union security clauses, specifically Article 248 (e), which states, x x x Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. This case which involves the application of a collective bargaining agreement with a union shop clause should be resolved principally from the standpoint of the clear provisions of our labor laws, and the express terms of the CBA in question, and not by inference from the general consequence of the merger of corporations under the Corporation Code, which obviously does not deal with and, therefore, is silent on the terms and conditions of employment in corporations or juridical entities.

(b) May a newly-regularized employee of Nagrab Corporation (who is not-part of the absorbed employees) refuse to join Nagrab Union? How would you advise the human resources manager of Nagrab Corporation to proceed? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The newly-regularized employee of Nagrab Corporation (who is not-part of the absorbed employees) cannot refuse to join Nagrab Union in view of the union security  clause provision of the CBA. While the right to join includes the right not to join, however, the exception is the UNION SECURITY CLAUSE where it imposes upon employees  the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. Thus, I will advise the human resources manager of Nagrab Corporation to comply with the provision of the CAB stating that : “New_employees within the coverage of the bargaining unit who may be regularly employed shall become members of Nagrab Union.

XVII

Upon compliance with the legal requirements on the conduct of a strike, Navarra Union staged a strike against Newfound Corporation on account of a collective bargaining deadlock. During the strike, some members of Navarra Union broke the windows and punctured the tires of the company-owned buses. he Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.

(a) Should all striking employees be admitted back to work upon the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment? Will these include striking employees who damaged company properties? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

All striking employees be admitted back to work and including striking employees who damaged company properties. The effect of assumption of jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor is clear under Article 278 (g) which provides in substance that such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.(b) May the company, readmit strikers only by restoring them to the payroll? 5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The company may not readmit strikers by restoring them to the payroll. The phrase “under the same terms and conditions” found in Article 278 (g) [263 (g)]  of the Labor Code was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of the  University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 151379, January 14, 2005 as follows:

With respect to the Secretary’s Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase “under the same terms and conditions” makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.

Clearly, reinstatement should be actual and not payroll reinstatement.

XVIII

Nestor and Nadine have been living in for the last 10 years without the benefit of marriage. Their union has produced four children. Nadine was three months pregnant with her 5th child when Nestor left her for another woman. When Nadine was eight months pregnant with her 5th  child, she applied for maternity leave benefits. Her employer refused on the ground that this was already her 5" pregnancy and that she was only living in with the father of her child, who is now in a relationship with another woman. When Nadine gave birth, Nestor applied for paternity leave benefits. His employer also denied the application on the same grounds that Nadine’s employer denied her application.

(a) Can Nadine’s employer legally deny her claim for maternity benefits? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Nadine’s employer can legally deny her claim for maternity benefits. This is because the maternity benefits shall be paid only for the first four (4) deliveries or miscarriages. (See Section 14-A, RA 8282) In this case, the said pregnancy was the 5th child of Nadine. Thus, she already exhausted the limitations for entitlement to maternity benefits under the law.

(b) Can Nestor’s employer legally deny his claim for paternity benefits? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Nestor’s employer can legally deny his claim for paternity benefits for his failure to comply with the conditions for entitlement to paternity benefits.

Under the law, a married male employee shall be entitled to paternity benefits provided that:

a. he is an employee at the time of delivery of his child;

b. he is cohabiting with his spouse at the time she gives birth or suffers a miscarriage.

c. he has applied for paternity leave in accordance with Section 4 hereof; and

d. his wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage. (Section 3, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8187 for the Private Sector)

In this case, Nadine is not Nestor’s lawful wife to whom he is cohabiting.

XIX

Northeast Airlines sent notices to transfer without diminution in salary or rank, to 50 ground crew personnel who were front-liners at Northeast Airlines counters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). The 50 employees were informed that they would be distributed to various airports in Mindanao to anticipate robust passenger volume growth in the area. Northeast Union representing rank-and-file employees, filed unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal cases before the NLRC, citing, among others, the inconvenience of the 50 concerned employees and union discrimination, as 8 of the 50 concerned round crew personnel were union officers. Also, the Union argued that Northeast Airlines could easily hire additional employees from Mindanao to boost  ground operations in the Mindanao airports.

a) Will the transfer of the 50 ground crew personnel amount to Illegal dismissal (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The transfer of the 50 ground crew personnel does not amount to Illegal dismissal. This is because their transfer is a valid exercise of management prerogatives.

In Gemina, Jr. v. Bankwise, Inc. (Thrift Bank) G.R. No. 175365, October 23, 2013, it was held: The employer’s right to conduct the affairs of its business, according to its own discretion and judgment, is well-recognized. An employer has a free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment and the only criterion to guide the exercise of its management prerogative is that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable. (The Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 377, 398-399)

According to Endico v. Quantum Foods Distribution Center, G.R.  161615, January 30,2009, “Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The test for determining the validity of the transfer of employees was explained in  the case of Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129843, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA 401, 408-409 the Supreme Court explained the test for determining the validity of the transfer of employees, as follows:

But, like other rights, there are limits thereto.  The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.  Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised.  Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.  In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.

As their employer, Northeast Airlines has the right to regulate, according to its discretion and best judgment, work assignments, work methods, work supervision, and work regulations, including the hiring, firing and discipline of its employees.  The Supreme Court upholds these management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws and valid agreements. (Challenge Socks Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165268, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA 356, 362-363)

In this case it does not show that Northeast Airlines implemented the transfer for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the said 50 ground crew personnel. b) Will the unfair labor practice case prosper? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The unfair labor practice case will not prosper. This is because the act did not constitute an act of interfering, restraining or coercing the said employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization under Article 259 [a] of the Labor Code.

In T & T Shoplifters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation v. T&T Shoplifters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation Workers Union, G.R. No. 191714, February 26, 2014 citing the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association – NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., (147 Phil. 194 [1971]) the Supreme  Court had occasion to lay down the test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, that is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

In the given facts, it does not show that the act of Northern Airlines in sending notices of transfer relates to the commission of acts that transgress their  right to organize or it was made  to interfere, restrain or coerce them with the exercise of their right to self-organization.

XX

In Northern Lights Corporation, union members Nad, Ned and Nod sought permission from the company to distribute flyers with respect to a weekend union activity. The company HR manager granted the request through a text message sent to another union member, Norlyn. While Nad, Ned, and Nod re distributing the flyers at the company assembly plant, a Company supervisor barged in and demanded that they cease from distributing the flyers, stating that the assembly line employees were trying to beat a production deadline and were thoroughly distracted. Norlyn tried to show the HR manager's text message authorizing flyer distribution during work hours, but the supervisor brushed it aside. As a result, Nad, Ned, and Nod were suspended for violating company rules on trespass and highly-limited union activities during work hours. The Union filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) case before the NLRC for union discrimination.

a) Will the ULP case filed by the Union prosper? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The ULP case filed by the Union will not prosper. This is because the act did not constitute an act of interfering, restraining or coercing the said employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization under Article 259 [a] of the Labor Code.

In T & T Shoplifters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation v. T&T Shoplifters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation Workers Union, G.R. No. 191714, February 26, 2014 citing the case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association – NATU v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., (147 Phil. 194 [1971]) the Supreme  Court had occasion to lay down the test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, that is, whether the employer has engaged in conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees’ rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

In the given facts, it does not show that the act of the company supervisor in barging in and demanding for Nad, Ned, and Nod  to cease from distributing the flyers relates to the commission of acts that transgress their  right to organize or it was made  to interfere, restrain or coerce them with the exercise of their right to self-organization.

b) Assume the NLRC ruled in favor of the Union. The Labor Arbiter's judgment included, among others, an award for moral and exemplary damages at PhP50,000.00 each for Nad, Ned, and Nod. Northern Lights Corporation argued that any award of damages should be given to the Union and not individually to its members. Is Northern Lights Corporation correct? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Northern Lights Corporation is not correct.  The rights that were violated belongs to the union members, Nad, Ned, and Nod,  and not the union itself.  Further, the said union members were the real party in interest in the said case for ULP filed by the union against the corporation and not the union itself.  The union is a juridical person and as a rule it cannot not suffer moral damages.