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UNDERSTAND FORM OF MARRIAGE IN FAMILY LAW


FORMS OF MARRIAGE   




Before the Law of Marriage Act 1971 [Cap. 29 R. E. 2002] came into force there were various forms of marriage recognized under the personal and religious laws applicable to the communities residing in Tanzania. After 1971 the Law of Marriage Act enacted uniform provisions applicable to all forms of marriage while also permitting the application of personal and religious laws in matters such as the mode of celebrating a marriage.  Hence, section 25 LMA states that a marriage may be contracted in Tanzania, either in civil form, in accordance with the religious rites of the parties or in accordance with the customary rites of the parties. Apart from giving freedom to the parties to contract a marriage in accordance with their personal laws, the law also grants them the freedom to contract a civil marriage irrespective of their customs or religious persuasion.
In this lecture, instead of discussing the procedure for celebrating various forms of marriage under Tanzania law, we will, instead, examine the forms of marriage recognised under the Law of Marriage Act. We begin with the Civil marriage form, followed by Christian form, the Islamic form, the customary form and finally, what we may call, for want of a better term, the ‘Section 160’  form of marriage. 


BOX
At the end of this post the reader will:
i)                    Acquire an understanding of the five forms of marriage that are provided for under the Law of Marriage Act. These are:
a.  The Civil form of Marriage with its unique status in that it is open to anyone irrespective of his or her cultural or religious affiliation;
b.      The Christian form of Marriage, reserved for those who profess the Christian faith;
c.       The Islamic form of Marriage; reserved for the members of the Islamic faith;
d.      Customary form of Marriage;  for parties who (or one of them) belongs to a particular customary community; and
e.   Section 160 form of Marriage; though not accepted by certain judges as a form of marriage though its existence remains difficult to deny.
ii)               Will understand the link between the five forms of marriage and the diversity of the people’s culture;  their religious affiliations; and the plurality of the country’s legal system

 

END OF BOX

   Civil Form of Marriage

The civil form of marriage is provided for under Law of Marriage Act (LMA)[Cap 29 R.E 2002] under Part II (sections 18-35) which makes provisions for the celebration of a civil form of marriage. According to s 18(1) a man and a woman who desire to contract a marriage are required to give a notice of their intention to marry to the Registrar of Marriages at least twenty-one days before the wedding day. The Registrar General, Deputy and Assistant Registrars-General are appointed under sections 3-8 of the LMA. The notice of intention to marry should contain a number of particulars as stipulated under s 18(2) (a) to (i). These particulars seek primarily to establish, among other things, the date of the intended marriage, the identity of the parties, their respective ages, their capacity to marry and the intended form of marriage the parties wish to contract.
The primary object of the notice of intention to marry is to notify the general public about the intended marriage. As a general principle, a marriage is and must always be, a public event rather than a clandestine or secret affair.[1]Hence, the Registrar or registration officer to whom the notice is made has the obligation to make this intention known locally by such means as may be prescribed or as are customarily used to make known matters of public importance. Such notice enables any member of the public to file an objection to the intended marriage on the ground that he or she is aware of facts that constitute a legal impediment to marriage. See also s 24 LMA where notice may be dispensed with by the Registrar General. There is a laid down procedure under s 21 and s 22 LMA for determining such an objection by way of court proceedings or adjudication by the Marriage Conciliatory Board.


 The status of a Civil Marriage

At the outset it is important to stress the unique status of a civil marriage in relation to other forms of marriage. First it is close to the state legal system in that it is not aligned to a particular religion or cultural group. It stands out as a form of marriage available to anyone who qualifies to marry irrespective of his religious or cultural background. Hence, it is provided under section 25 (1) LMA that a person has the option either to contract a marriage in accordance with his/her religious rites, customary rites or may choose to contract a civil marriage.
It should be stressed further that the Tanzania civil marriage  form originated  from the British colonial era. Historically, its origin is the first English marriage law known as Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act of 1753. Before 1971 the civil form of marriage was contracted under the Marriage Ordinance (RL Cap 109). The civil marriage shares a similar jurisprudence with most civil marriages in the Common Law world such as Australia, Canada, the United States of America and, of course, our East African neighbours, Kenya and  Uganda. Indeed, even the procedures for contracting a civil marriage found in the LMA are taken with minor modifications from English law. Not only that, the definition of marriage found in s 9(2) LMA is derived from the famous case of Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P.&D. 130 where Lord Penzance defined an English marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”
Civil marriages have traditionally been monogamous, thus answering to Lord Penzance’s definition. It is still the case in most common law systems, except Tanzania which departed from this tradition in 1971. Section 29(c ) LMA states that  after contracting a civil marriage, parties my request the district registrar “to make an entry in the register whether the marriage shall be monogamous or polygamous..” The registrar has to satisfy oneself that both parties consent to such an endorsement. This provision means that where the entry is made that the said civil marriage is polygamous, then such a civil marriage will become potentially polygamous. And the male party to such a marriage retains the capacity to contract another civil (or other form of) marriage with another woman or women while his previous civil marriage remains subsisting. 
Note further that a marriage that was by inception monogamous may also be converted under s 11 LMA on the joint declaration of the parties made before a judge, a resident magistrate or district magistrate. 
The procedure for contracting a civil marriage which is contained under sections 18-29 LMA is straightforward and students are strongly recommended to read and become acquainted with these provisions.
2.3 Christian Form of Marriage
One way of understanding the Christian form of marriage is once again to return to the history of English family law.  Before the enactment of the first Marriage Act of 1753, there was no specific procedure, laid down by law, for contracting a marriage. The most widely known form of marriage is the common law marriage which historically could be formed by the parties saying to one another (in turn) the following words: “I (mentioning his/her name) take you (mentioning her/his name) to be my wife/husband. Thereafter the parties would perform the first sexual act together known as consummation of the marriage and begin living together as husband and wife. These would be validly married. It did not matter whether the exchange of these magic words took place in public or private.
In the case of Christians,. whether of the Church of England (after 1534-1555 and 1558 on) or of Rome, there was a requirement that the exchange of vows take place at the outside the Church before an ordained clergy. Additional procedures were added by the Church especially the publication of banns on three consecutive Sundays in the local church of the bride and the groom.
The enactment of the English first Marriage Act 1573 brought all marriages under state control. But the Act also permitted the Christian churches to continue to celebrate their marriage in accordance with their existing procedures as long as they complied with the fundamental provisions of the Act.
Though taking place later in time, a comparable arrangement was followed in Tanzania. The Law Marriage Act, 1971 granted freedom to various faiths and local communities to celebrate marriages in accordance with their faiths as long as they complied with the fundamental principles of marriage laid down by the LMA. Hence, section 25 (1)(b) LMA states that a marriage may be contracted in Tanzania, where both parties belong to a specified religion, according to the rites of that religion. Section 30(1) states that a marriage may be celebrated according to the rites of a specified religion in any place habitually used as a place of public worship or a place of gathering by the followers of that religion, by a minister of that religion who has been licensed in that behalf by the Registrar General.
Section 30(2) LMA further states that the Registrar- General may, on the application of a proper authority of any specified religion license any minister of that religion to celebrate marriage. Finally, s 25(3) LMA provides that for purposes of this Act, a marriage in Christian form means a marriage celebrated in a church in the manner recognised by the Christian faith or by any denomination or sect of that faith.  In sum, the LMA seeks to facilitate marriages in accordance with the existing faiths and customs as long as these marriages comply with the fundamental conditions of the LMA. As will be noted below, the same principle applies to customary and Islamic marriages


 Islamic Form of Marriage

Section    25(3) LMA states that for the purposes of this Act, a marriage in Islamic form means a marriage contracted in the manner recognised by Islam or by any school or sect of that faith. Section 30 (3) LMA states that a marriage may be celebrated in Islamic form  by any kadhi or by a registration officer who is a Muslim. Furthermore, section 30(4) states that a Muslim priest or preacher may, on application made by him, be licensed as a kadhieither generally or for any specified community. Once licensed, the priest or kadhi, as the case may be, acquires the authority to celebrate a marriage in accordance with the Law of Marriage Act. Finally, section 32(a) LMA states that it shall be the duty of every kadhi or registration officer to whom notice has been given that a marriage is intended to be contracted in Islamic form; so far as is reasonably practicable, to attend the celebration of that marriage.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the LMA leaves enough room to the intended parties to an Islamic marriage to contract their marriage in the form recognised by their religion as long as they comply with the essential conditions laid down by the LMA. In this connection, the rules governing the formation of an Islamic marriage are not specifically stipulated in the LMA. They are to be found in the existing body of Islamic law and practice. This is clear from the provisions of s 25(3) which states that a marriage in Islamic form means a marriage contracted in the manner recognised by Islam or by any school or sect of that faith.[2]  

  Customary Form Marriage

Section 25(1)(d) LMA states that a marriage may, subject to the provisions of the LMA, be contracted in Tanzania where parties belong to a community or to communities which follow customary law, in accordance with the rites of the customary  law. The LMA does not lay down a specific procedure for contracting a customary marriage. There are nonetheless indications in the LMA regarding, notice of intention to marry which is anticipated by section 32(b) LMA. The latter section states that it shall be the duty of every registration officer to whom notice has been given that a marriage is intended to be contracted according to the rites recognized by customary law, so far as is reasonably practicable, to attend that marriage. It seems that notice of intention to marry under customary law is not mandatory. This is in contrast to the notice required for civil forms of marriage.[3] The reason, as noted before, is to allow as much freedom to the various faiths and local communities to regulate their procedure for contracting a marriage as long as they comply with the essential aspects such as those relating to capacity to marry. In sum, subject to the overriding provisions of the LMA, a customary marriage is a marriage recognised by the customary law of the parties.[4]It is important to note however that parties to a customary marriage are required to register their marriage and obtain a marriage certificate as provided by s 43(5)LMA. Although failure to register a marriage does not affect it is advantageous to have a marriage certificate should there be a need to prove the existence of the said marriage.[5]


  Section 160 Marriage

Section 160 (1) LMA states that where it is proved that a man and a woman have lived together as man and wife for a period of at least two years and have, during that period, acquired a reputation of being husband and wife there will arise a rebuttable presumption that the two are duly married. The history of section 160 is long and still unfolding; its intricacies are also diverse. These aspects will not be discussed in detail in this lecture.[6]However, what cannot be avoided in this Lecture is to highlight to the student that there have been sharp differences between the eminent judges in the interpretation and application of section 160 LMA. Some judges have in effect held that there exists a fifth form of marriage under Section 160.[7] 

As noted by Mwalusanya J,
“The only three important elements to constitute a presumption of marriage are:
a)      that the parties have cohabited for [at least] two years;
b)      the parties have acquired a reputation of being husband and wife;
c)      that there was no formal marriage ceremony between the said couple.[8]
       d)     That is enough to constitute a marriage.”  [9]

In Festael Sadikiel Macha v Salum Shaban[10] Manento JK upheld the decision of the lower court which dissolved a ‘section 160’ form of marriage and ordered division of assets under s 114 LMA. As noted by the appellate judge, “it was proper for the trial primary court magistrate to rule that the appellant and husband were husband and wife, and proceed to deal with the issue of dissolution of the marriage, and having found that the marriage had broken down irreparably, granted the divorce.”
Other judges, however, have taken the opposite position, arguing that once it is proved that the parties did not in fact go through a marriage ceremony that is sufficient to rebut the presumption of marriage under s 160 LMA and that means there is no marriage.[11] The leading case on this view and which has been followed by a number of eminent judges is Francis s/o Leo v Paschal Simon Maganga[12]where Mfalila J (as he was then) held that the presumption that a man and a woman were duly married may be rebutted if it can be proved (among other things) that they did not go through a marriage ceremony. According to Mfalila J, the words ‘duly married’ refer to the forms and procedures for marriage provided for under the Law of Marriage Act. “Therefore all that is required to rebut such presumption is to establish that the two never when through a ceremony of marriage recognised under the Act”

The foregoing position was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Hemedi S Tamim v Renata Mashayo.[13]  It would appear therefore, consistent with the doctrine of precedent, that the judges who hold that absence of a ceremony of marriage is sufficient to rebut the presumption of marriage under s 160(1)LMA have, at least for now, the support of the highest court.[14]
Section 160 marriage arise primarily in cases where parties who have capacity to marry under LMA do not undergo any ceremony of marriage but instead live together for at lease two years as if they are married and, in due course, do acquire a reputation of being married.[15]  There are others who go through an incomplete marriage ceremony (usually under customary law) and several years later try to have their marriage terminated as if it was a regular form of marriage. But where it is shown that the parties did not regard one another as husband and if, then, obviously the presumption of marriage under s 160 will not arise.[16]


 Conversion of Marriage
Section 11 of the Law of Marriage Act states that a marriage contracted in Tanganyika may be converted either from monogamous to potentially polygamous; or if the husband has one wife only, from potentially polygamous to monogamous. Such conversion is effected by a declaration made jointly by the husband and wife, that both of them have consented to the conversion. A declaration to convert a marriage under s 11 LMA shall be made before a judge of the High Court, a Resident Magistrate or a District Magistrate, who shall put in writing such a declaration. The declaration must also be signed by the husband and the wife and by the judicial officer before whom it has been made. Thereafter a copy of such declaration must be immediately transmitted to the Registrar-General of Marriages and Divorces appointed under s 3 LMA.
Section 11(4) LMA provides that no marriage shall be converted otherwise except as provided above. Moreover, no marriage between two Christians which was celebrated in Christian form shall be converted from monogamous to potentially polygamous so long as both parties continue to profess the Christian faith.  The foregoing prohibition to conversion applies notwithstanding that the marriage was preceded or succeeded by a ceremony of marriage between the same parties in civil or any other form.

It is helpful to note the background to section 11 LMA. As noted above, several provisions of the LMA recognise and seek to accommodate the religious and cultural plurality of the Tanzanian community by allowing couples a certain degree of flexibility in the organization of their family relations and the form of marriage they wish to contract. The provision for conversion is an extension of this policy of the LMA. Moreover, the prohibition to convert Christian marriages was also brought in to accommodate the concerns of certain Christian leaders who objected to the conversion of Christian monogamous marriage.[17]      

          
  Summary and Conclusion
The existence of five forms of marriage is clear evidence that Tanzania is a country of many cultures and religions. Furthermore, the fact that these forms of marriage are recognized and regulated under one umbrella legislation, the LMA, reflects the sensitivity of the legal system to the country’s cultural pluralism. In the lectures that follow the strands of sensitivity to cultural and religious pluralism will continue to come up in our discussion. It is important to remember that family law is about people and how they regulate their relationship from day to day. The next lecture considers problems that can arise from a failure to comply with the legal procedures for contracting a marriage and how this affects the validity of a marriage.


Bibliography

Bart Rwezaura ‘Presumption of Marriage in Tanzania’ (1985) 18 Verfasung und Recht in Ubersee 169-179.
 Bart Rwezaura,  ‘The Court of Appeal of Tanzania and the Development of  the law of domestic relations”. Vol 16 No 2 (1989) Eastern Africa Law Review 146-186 esp 159-164
Bart Rwezaura, The Proposed Abolition of De Facto Unions in Tanzania: A case of Sailing against the Social Current’ Journal of African Law, (1998) 42, 187-214
United Republic of Tanzania, The Government White Paper No 1 of 1969: Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage, Dar es Salaam.
C O Kaisi, Women under Presumption of Marriage; A Critical Analysis of the Law, Practice and Social Implications of s 160 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971.  LLM Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam (1994)


Citation

[1] See section 28 LMA which provides for members of the public to attend the celebration of a civil marriage. In the case of religious marriages, any member of that religious community or customary community may attend the ceremony without being specifically invited.

[2]  See s 38(2) which further accommodates Islamic marriages by permitting the bride to be absent at the wedding as long as her male guardian, (the walii) is present to consent to the marriage on her behalf.

[3]  But then see section 41(c) which states that a marriage complies with all other requirements of the LMA shall be valid for all purposes notwithstanding the failure to give notice of intention to marry

[4] See s 25(1)(d) LMA

[5]See  Ahmed Ismail v Juma Rajabu 1985 TLR 204

[6]For a detailed discussion of s 160 unions, see Bart Rwezaura, The Proposed Abolition of De Facto Unions in Tanzania: A case of Sailing against the Social Current’ Journal of African Law, (1998) 42, 187-214 and B A Rwezaura,  “The Court of Appeal of Tanzania and the Development of  the law of domestic relations”. Vol 16 No 2 (1989) Eastern Africa Law Review 146-186 esp. 159-164

[7] See John Kirakwe v Iddi Sinko 1989 TLR 215 (HC) per Mwalusanya J; Elizabeth Salwiba v Peter Obara [1975] LRT n 52, Raphael Dibogo v Flabianus Wambura 1975 LRT n 42. In Theresia Msiwao v Mwamba Mohamed (DSM) High Court (PC) Civ App No 10 of 1978 the High Court held that in cases where the presumption under s 160 has not been rebutted, the parties remain husband and wife and will be so regarded by the law until they have taken “the necessary steps to bring the relationship to an end”. See also Ally Mfaume Issa v Fatuma Mohamedi Alkamu 1974 LRT n 67 (per Kisanga J).See also Salum Itandala [1982] TLR 333. And more recently,  F. Twaibu J has also held that parties were validly married in terms of s 160 (1) of the Law of Marriage Act (p 29( R. E .2002). See Joseph Peter v Fatuma Omary, DSM High Court Civil App No 35 of 2011 (date of decision 11.04.12).

[8]See John Kirakwe (above)

[9]See also Hadija Hamis v Moses Ndesanjo (Singida High Court Matr App No 2 of 1992 (per MwalusanyaJ)

[10]DSM High Court Civil App No 64 of 2004 per Manento JK (unreported) (decided on 13 June 2006)

[11]Francis Leo v Paschal Simon Maganga [1978] LRT n 22 (per Mafalila J); Harubushi Seif v Amina Rajabu 1986 TLR 221 (per Korosso J); Zaina Ismail v Saidi Mkondo 1985 TLR 239 (Kapoor Ag J); Anastasia Mapunda v Agathon Mbepera (Mtwara) High Court Civ App No 45 of 1992 (Kazimoto J)

[12]See above.

[13]1994 TLR 197 (CA) (Omar, Mnzavas and Mfalila JJA) The judgement in this case was written by Mfalila JA

[14]Note that the Court of Appeal does not answer (in the above case) several questions raised by s 160 including cases where there is an incomplete marriage ceremony  such as in John Kirakwe v Iddi Sinko 1989 TLR 215

[15]For a discussion on initial capacity to marry see Charles Ruyembe v Mwajuma Saleh (citation?)Note also the issue of lack of initial capacity to marry came up in Francis s/o Leo  (cited above) and Mfalila J held  that lack of initial capacity to marry is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under s 160 LMA.  But as I have argued elsewhere, this is a difficult proposition because it presupposes that the law can presume against itself. In other words, the law cannot prohibit a marriage where parties have no initial capacity to marry and still create a presumption, albeit rebuttable, in favour of such a marriage.

[16] That is: no presumption from the beginning.

[17][17] Note that the prohibition applies as long as both parties continue to profess the Christian faith. Thus a Christian couple  who initially contracted a Christian monogamous marriage may convert their marriage to potentially polygamous marriage if one or both parties cease to belong to the Christian faith.

Introduction to family law


 Scope of Family Law

 Want to know the form of marriage? Click here to read
Before embarking on the study of family law it is essential to determine its scope by drawing boundaries around a specific area so that we can identify what is in and what is outside our field of study. However, it should be noted that the exercise of setting boundaries has to be arbitrary and artificial. It is done primarily for the sake of convenience and content management.  Under normal conditions, the subject of family law can be very wide.  It would cover any law touching on or having an effect on the family.  And the term ‘family’ as we shall see shortly is also wide and difficult to define.
For purposes of this study, family law includes the law (or laws) relating to the formation of marriage; the factors or conditions affecting the validity of marriage; the rights and obligations arising from marriage; protection of family members from harm and hardships including financial difficulties. It also covers the law governing property relations between the spouses; dissolution of marriage and consequential matters such as post-divorce (and post-separation) maintenance and division of matrimonial assets.
Where a married couple has infant children, family law makes provisions for determining who will have their care. The law relating to the status and rights of the child within the family also falls under this branch of the law. It also covers the law of adoption, guardianship, foster care, and child support.
Given the plurality of our laws governing the family, it is not possible to study family law without considering the interaction between various laws relating to the family within our legal system. Consideration of the historical background of various laws relating to the family will also be made in order to give the student a deeper understanding of the law and its current state and future development.

BOX
At the end of this post reader will:
i)       Become aware of the boundaries of family law;
ii)       Acquire an understanding of the subject of family law by focusing on what family law does (functionalist approach) instead of what it is;
iii)        Grasp the sources of family law;
iv)         Understand the relationship between family law and legal pluralism; and
v)           Understand the connection between family law and social change.



 Functions of Family Law

The four primary functions of family law are: constitutive, regulatory, protective and re-constitutive.  The constitutive function involves turning a man and woman into husband and wife and more generally making provision for the establishment of family relationships. Family law also regulates the relations between family members as well as their relations with outsiders. It plays a protective function in cases of domestic violence, including matters such asspousal and child abuse and makes provisions for economic support for weaker family members including children.
When parties cannot live together as a family, the law dissolves their existing relationships and re-constitutes them into non-family members such as divorcees and grants them capacity to form family relationships with others. It must be conceded that certain relationships such as parenthood cannot be dissolved at will. And for those of the Roman Catholic faith, only death can legally put husband and wife asunder.

Family law also performs the protective function, especially in relation to the weaker family members such as wives and minor children of the family. The law of divorce, which is part of family law, has the function of dissolving the marriage relationship between the couple thus turning them into semi-strangers. On divorce, the parties to a monogamous marriage regain their legal capacity to marry. There are also provisions under the law of adoption for an adopted child to be re-adopted by another family.

The idea of conceptualizing family law in terms of what it does, rather than merely what it is, enables the student to think more clearly about the subject and to develop an analytical framework that seeks to evaluate the extent to which the law does or fails to performthose functions and whether such functions are exclusively performed by law or in partnership with other social forces.


 Family Law and Legal Pluralism

It has been noted above that one cannot study family law without at the same time also studying legal pluralism. This is primarily because of the history of our legal system which includes the imposition of colonial law upon the subject population and their indigenous legal systems. It is also a history of Tanzania's contact and ultimately adoption of non-indigenous religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Budhism. Each religion has its origins from a different civilization with its own legal history and its own system of family law.
During the British colonial era, the law permitted each social group and each religious group to operate its own family law system. The law also made available a neutral system of state law which was ostensiblynon-religious and non-indigenous. It permitted certain individuals to cross over cultural lines or membership of one religion and take advantage of the family law system that appeared tothem to be most convenient. For example, a person from the Sukuma ethnic group could marry under Sukuma customary law or under Islamic law if that person was a Muslim. He could also opt to marry under the civil law system thus taking advantage of existing statutory law.
The existence of multiple systems of family law in a single legal system gave rise to a number of problems. These include the existence of different legal consequences of marriage and different remedies basing on the system of law selected by an individual. It was also necessary for the courts to determine which law was applicable in a given case where an individual appeared to be subject to more than one system of personal law.[1]Courts had to develop a new jurisprudence of choice of law and to deal with what came to be widely known as internal conflict of laws.[2]
In order to put an end to these and other related problems and to reform the law, a single piece of legislation was enacted that became known as the Law of Marriage Act of 1971. This was followed in 2009 by the Law of the Child Act.

  Sources of Family Law

The sources family law,  include the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as amended from time to time, the general law (or statutory law), customary law, Islamic law, Hindu law, case law, and various elements of foreign law which are recognized by our legal system. A number of regional and international human rights treaties to which Tanzania is a party constitute sources of family law. As will be noted later, courts do draw on these treaties, when appropriate, to decide family law disputes.

 Family Law and Social Change

It is appropriate to raise at the outset the question of family law and social change. This is because, like legal pluralism, social change cuts across all areas of family law. For example, family relations are greatly affected by social change. Matters such as the age at which one chooses to get married or the person one wishes to marry are matters that may change over time with greater attainment of education by women. Social change does also generate different expectations in inter-spousal relations and may move a society towards gender equality.
Parent and child relations are also affected by social change. Greater social awareness of the rights of the child has the effect of undermining certain aspects of parental authority while also increasing parental responsibilities. Marital tensions may increase due to the weakening of extended family bonds and the rise of the nuclear family as a source of emotional support. The rise in the divorce rate, especially in urban areas, is often associated with a number of factors including the rise of the nuclear family as an economic entity and a source of emotional support.
In recent years, Tanzania has experienced a sharp rise in intermarriages between many ethnic groups. This development will give rise to changes in relations between spouses and their children. It will also generate change in the way children are raised. Relations between in-laws will also change, including relations between children and their grandparents as well as their extended family.
In sum a student of family law cannot ignore social change given that it is a cross-cutting factor and generates forces that affect the day to day application of family law. It also generates conditions that in time may call for the need to reform the law in order to accommodate change.


 Summary and Conclusion

This lecture has raised key and recurrent issues. It seeks to provide to the student a convenient entry point into the subject of family law. The lecture has identified the boundaries of the subject and offered an outline of what family law seeks to do. The plurality of laws in which family law is embedded has been identified as a cross-cutting issue while also pointing at the sources of the subject. The significance of social change to the study of family law has been underlined and its potential to generate pressure for reform has been stressed. The themes outlined above in this lecture will remain with us throughout the entire course and need to be kept in mind at all times.




References: 
 F Banda  (2005) Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective, Hart Publishing, Oxford (esp pp 13-40).
G F A Sawyerr (1967) Internal Conflict of Laws in  East Africa in Sawyerr GFA (ed)  East African Law and Social Change, Nairobi, East African Publishing House pp 110-71
B A Rwezaura and U Wanitzek, Family Law Reform in Tanzania: A Social-Legal Report, International Journal of Law and the Family2 (1988) 1-26
B A Rwezaura,  The Integration of Personal Laws: Tanzania’s Experience, Zimbabwe Law Journal Vol, 1 & 2, 85-96
E Cotran, Integration of Courts and Application of Customary Law in Kenya, East African Law Journal, Vol 4 (1968) 14-20
United Republic of Tanzania, Government Paper No. 1 of 1969 Government Proposals on Uniform Law of Marriage, (The White Paper) Dar es Salaam, Government Printer.
United Republic of Tanzania, Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, Report of the Commission on Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (No 5 of 1971) April 1994.
The Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, The Spry Report, Nairobi, Government Printer (1968)

Citations



[1]The case of Mohamed Ndwata v Hamisi Omari 1988 TLR 137 was described by Samatta J (as he then was) as a “somewhat unusual” . The claimant husband sued his father in law for recovery of dowry and various traditional payments he made when he married the respondent’s daughter. The [marriage] was set aside by a Primary Court in an earlier case on the ground that the wife had unreasonably refused to consummate the marriage. The case went all the way to the High Court even though the amount being claimed was by far smaller than the cost of litigation. It seemed the former husband strongly believed he was entitled to claim everything because the wife had refused to have the marriage consummated. Samatta J held, dismissing the former husband’s appeal, that “whatever the legal position might have been under the Customary Law or the Islamic Law, the law now, as I apprehend it, is that once the marriage has taken place, any gifts, whether traditional or otherwise, given in contemplation of the marriage, become the absolute property of the recipients.” Citing s 3A of the JALO, Cap 453, the learned judge noted that “any rules of Customary Law or Islamic Law which might have regulated the return of gifts made in contemplation of a marriage are now superseded by the provisions of  s 71 LMA.” It is clear that the husband was greatly moved by a sense of justice based on his understanding of customary law. Sadly, he found that customary law had been superseded by the LMA. See also Hussein Mbwana v Amiri Chongwe, Digest of Appeals from Local Courts (1963) Vo X per Spry J where he noted that “ I see no reason, therefore, why brideprice should not be paid under customary law at the time when an Islamic marriage takes place just as it frequently is on the celebration of an African Christian marriage.”  See also Salum Athumani v Mwamini Hamisi1983 TLR 107 (HC) where  Bahati Ag J (as he then was ) applying Islamic law,  held that “under Muslim law dowry is not returnable after consummation of marriage and the position is even stronger where the husband has been found to be the guilty party.”


[2]In Basiliza Bobret Nyimbo v Henry Simon Nyimbo, High Court (DSM) Matrimonial Cause No 10 of 1983 (Lubuva J) (Unreported) the respondent went through a Christian form of marriage at a Lutheran church in 1959. In 1965 he purported to have that marriage dissolved extra-judicially by a Kadhi. Believing himself to be free of a marriage bond, the respondent went through a second marriage ceremony with the petitioner. It was held that the second ceremony was a nullity and did not result in a valid marriage.


ANARITA KARIMI NJERU vs THE REPUBLIC

ANARITA KARIMI NJERU vs THE REPUBLIC (NO.1)
HIGH COURT AT NAIROBI (TREVELYAN AND HANCOX JJ)
MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4 OF 1979
JANUARY 16, 29, 1979


Constitutional interpretation – Duty of court to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution.
Constitutional law – A person may only use the constitution for redress where no other action is available to him.
  The applicant was tried before the resident Magistrate, Meru, upon two charges of stealing Shs.46,574 and Shs.9,936/= by a person employed in the public service.
 She alleged that she was refused an adjournment to enable her call her witness of whom she had notified the court.  She however did not thereupon ask for a reference to the High Court as to whether or not such denial was constitutional but instead allowed the trial to go on and to be completed.  It was upon conviction and sentence that she drew a petition of appeal, seeking court’s declaration that the provisions of S.77 of the Constitution of Kenya were contravened during her trial and an order that her trial be nullified or otherwise disposed of under those provisions of the Constitution.  Counsel for the respondent submitted that the application was incompetent in that it was too late for the appellant now to seek redress because she could and should have done so whilst on trial in the subordinate court and that having appealed or sought to appeal to this court against her conviction and sentence should not be allowed to come here again for what is in effect the same purpose.


  Held:         1. The only complaint that can lie of an alleged refusal to afford the defence “reasonable” facilities   under S.77 (2) (e) of the Constitution of Kenya is only in regard to that witness who has been notified         to court by the party wishing to call him.
              2. Where a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter involving a reference to the constitution it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.
 3. An argument founded on what is claimed to be the spirit of the Constitution is always attractive for   it has a powerful appeal to sentiment and emotion but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the      Constitution from the language of the Constitution.  What one may believe to be the spirit of the constitution cannot prevail of the language of the constitution does not support that view.
              4. In a document enshrining the rights and freedoms of the individual, is it not fit to limit to a single  moment that time when redress must and can only be sought for the contravention of such rights.
               5.  The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed  according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The Tribunal that has to construe an    Act of a legislature, or indeed any other document has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used.  And in order to understand these words, it is natural to enquire what is the subject   – matter with respect to which they are used and the object in view.
                6.  It is clear that a person may utilise S.84 (1) of the Constitution to enable him secure redress if no   other action has ever been available to him but if such other action has been so availed, he cannot invoke the section.  The applicant cannot therefore now be heard on this application if the steps she  has taken amount to such other action.
                 7. High Court has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for prerogative writs on the criminal or civil   side of its jurisdiction according to the nature of the proceedings.

                   Application dismissed:
                   Counsel:
                   G.K Mwirichia for the applicant
                    E.K Muttu Senior State Counsel for the Republic
                     Legislation considered:
                    1.  The Constitution of Kenya SS. 70 – 84
                    Cases cited:
                    1. East African Community vs The Republic (1970) E.A. 457, E.A.C.A.
                     2. Gokpa (Dixon) vs Inspector – General of Police (1961) 1 AII NLR 423
                     3.  Keshava Menon vs State of Bomby (1951) SCR 228
                     4. Re Keshaval Punja Parbat Shah (1955)22 EACA 381
                      5. Muyimbwa vs Uganda (1969) E.A 433
                     6.Okunda vs The Republic (1970) EA 453
                     7. The Republic vs EL Mann (1969) E.A 357